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Abstract 
In the last few decades Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) have become more central in 
corporate decision making, including risk management and strategic planning. As a result 
of their growing importance, CFOs have been given more attention by both regulators 
and academics. In this thesis, I test the empirical importance of CFO incentives on the 
value creation of the firm. More specifically, I determine whether inside debt incentives 
align the CFO’s interest to value maximization of the firm value by investing in 
innovation.  
 
Based on agency theory, I predict that the higher the executives’ inside debt relative to 
firm leverage, the more closely their incentives are aligned with debtholders and the 
lesser the degree to which they engage in risk-taking to the detriment of debtholders. 
Therefore, since innovation is regarded as a highly risky investment in nature, I expect 
CFOs with higher inside debt to invest less in innovation. 
  
Using a balanced sample of 205 S&P 1500 firms over the period 2006-2010, I find that as 
predicted CFO relative inside debt is negatively associated with the investment in 
innovation, measured by R&D expenditures to total assets. I also address potential 
endogeneity between inside debt and innovation using 2SLS regressions and three 
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instrumental variables for inside debt (New CFO, State tax rate and CFO age). While the 
2SLS regression results show a similar negative relationship between CFO inside debt and 
innovation, this relationship is statistically insignificant.  Overall, this provides some 
doubt on my initial conclusion that CFO inside debt affects innovation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
A growing literature in corporate finance points to managerial traits in explaining 
corporate outcomes such as investment, acquisition, earnings management, and 
financing decision. The spectrum of managerial characteristics examined ranges from 
managers’ incentives such as pay for performance, salary, bonus, options and pensions, 
to behavioral traits such as risk aversion, overconfidence, and confirmation bias. Most of 
the literature focuses on chief executive officers (CEOs) given their role as the top 
decision-maker in the firm and due to data availability (Carpenter, 2011). More recently, 
papers investigate the role of the chief financial officer (CFO) (Ben-David, Graham and 
Harvey, 2008, 2010) or the top-five managers jointly (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta and Raman, 2002; Selody, 2010) in corporate decision making.  
Unlike decades ago, modern day CFOs have become more central in corporate 
decision making.  The role of the CFO includes not only financial reporting such as 
accounting, internal control, and budgeting and treasury responsibilities but also 
comprehensive decision making including risk management and strategic planning 
(Boggs, 2006).  As a result of their growing importance, CFOs within the firm have been 
given more attention by both regulators and academics. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) made CFOs (along with CEOs) explicitly responsible for the integrity of financial 
reports. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 2006 proxy statement revisions 
require that CFO compensation be disclosed along with that of the CEO and the next 
three highest paid executive officers. Geiger and North (2006, p. 781) note “CFOs wield 
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significant influence over the firm’s reported financial results”, and Ge et al. (2011, p. 22) 
state “CFOs are an important determinant of accounting practices”.   
 In this thesis, I test empirically the role of CFO incentives on innovation which 
maximizes the value of the firm. Holmstrom (1989) argues that innovation which 
generates extraordinary return for the firm is highly risky in nature. Because the benefits 
are realized often after many years of heavy investment, innovation expenditure 
provides an appropriate example of risky investment. Agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) argues that linking a manager’s compensation too closely to firm 
performance may lead to risk-avoiding tendency on the part of the manager. The 
underlying assumption is that the manager, unlike the owner, has already invested most 
of his non-diversifiable and non-tradable human capital in the firm and is thus more risk 
averse than external shareholders. A risk-averse manager, whose wealth is tied to firm-
value, may become myopic in outlook and be tempted to invest in projects that assure 
returns in the short run instead of the long run. Consequently, for a manager to invest in 
projects with a long gestation period and a high probability of failure, shareholders must 
provide contracts that create the appropriate incentives. 
Innovation can be defined by Schumpeter (1962) as the setting up of a new 
production function. His definition includes five specific cases leading to a new 
production function, which includes: (1) the introduction of a new good; (2) the 
introduction of a new method of production; (3) the opening of a new market; (4) the 
conquest of a new source of supply of new materials; and (5) the carrying out of a new 
organization of any industry (creating a monopolistic position or the breaking up of a 
monopoly). The degree of newness is the most widely used phenomenon in defining 
innovation. For instance, Van de Ven et al. (1986) mention that as long as the idea is 
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perceived as new to the people involved, it is an ‘innovation’ even though it may appear 
to others to be an ‘imitation’ of something that exists elsewhere. Newness can be 
associated with change. Damanpour (1996) affirms that innovation is conceived of as a 
means of changing an organization, either as a response to changes in the external 
environment or as a pre-emptive action to influence the environment. Therefore, 
innovation entails carrying out something new or implementing some changes that 
introduce the existing thing in a new way. Additionally it also must be worthy of 
commercialization.  
I investigate innovation for several other reasons. The first reason stems from the 
paramount importance of innovation to the success of a business due to the generation 
of new ideas and products. Even though organizations differ in their own priorities and 
sector specific issues, such as equity/debt financing, strategic planning, risk management 
and tax management, those that fail to innovate may run the risk of losing ground in 
competition, losing key staff or operating efficiency, all of which are crucial to 
shareholder wealth maximization.1 Innovation helps firms discover hidden opportunities 
and stay ahead of the competition as markets, technology, and trends shift (Tidd and 
Bessant, 2011). It also gives firms a commercial advantage in a saturated or rapidly 
shifting market. Stakeholders consider innovation to be value adding to the company. 2 
Zahra and Covin (1995, p. 44) note that “a critical aspect for the survival and long-term 
growth of corporations is the amount of investment in innovation aimed at new business 
creation and venturing, and strategic renewal.” However, there is limited research 
                                                   
1http://www.business.qld.gov.au/business/business-improvement/becoming-innovative-business/why-
business-innovation-important [accessed 20 August 2013] 
2http://www.business.qld.gov.au/business/business-improvement/becoming-innovative-business/why-
business-innovation-important [accessed 20 August 2013] 
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available that investigates managerial incentives that motivate the investment in 
innovation (Holthausen et al., 1995; Cassell et al. 2012). I focus on innovation as measured 
by research and development (R&D) expenditure. 
As for compensation, I focus on pensions and deferred compensation which are 
prevalent and often substantial (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). The limited research into 
these types of compensation is due to the lack of information disclosure pre 2006 (Wei 
and Yermack, 2011). With the introduction of new US legislation, a broad set of 
compensation variables are now available not only for CEOs but also for CFOs.  
For decades executives have received substantial amounts of pay in the form of 
defined benefit pension plans, and many also participate in both mandatory and 
voluntary schemes under which they delay the receipt of current-year salary and bonus 
income, leaving it invested with their firm at a certain rate of return until retirement. 
These forms of deferred compensation are known to economists as “inside debt,” and 
represent fixed obligations for the company to make future payments to corporate 
insiders (executives). Recent studies provide insights into the implications of pension 
plans in CEO compensation packages. For example, Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) 
document that pension and deferred compensation can comprise a major portion of 
executive pay, carrying a projected median actuarial value of USD 19.6 million for near-
retirement CEOs for S&P 500 firms in 2003. Edmans and Liu (2011) offer a theoretical 
basis for explaining how inside debt is an efficient compensation, which improves 
executive effort and limits risk shifting, especially when the threat of bankruptcy is 
significant. Tung and Wang (2011) show that during the subprime crisis of 2007-08, banks 
that held inside debt as executive compensation performed better than those that did 
not.  
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There are a range of other implication for firms that use pensions and deferred 
compensation. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) suggest that by affecting both the overall 
level of compensation and its composition, inside debt alters managerial incentives and 
in turn the size of the firm’s payouts, the composition of these payouts (dividends vs. 
share repurchases), the firm’s cost of debt and the choice of new securities to be issued 
(debt vs. equity). Additionally, inside debt affects project choice, capital expenditure 
choice, and the incentive to pursue diversifying mergers, among many other things. In 
this thesis, I employ CFO pension and deferred compensation arrangements for 205 large 
U.S. firms drawn from Fortune 500 ranking of companies for the period of 2006-2010 to 
evaluate the significance of managers’ inside debt incentives on long term investment of 
the firm.  
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1.2 Research aim and questions 
The challenge in designing incentives for managers to make their decisions 
consistent with shareholder wealth maximization remains the focus of the corporate 
governance literature. The willingness of top executives to undertake investment that 
increases shareholder value depends on both financial and non-financial factors. 
Although non-financial factors,3 such as promotion, job security and recognition, can be 
significant, this thesis focuses on inside debt compensation and how it affects value 
maximizing investment as measured by innovation. For an increasing number of firms 
and with increased internationalization, innovation has become a top priority for 
managers. With product lifetimes shortened due to the accelerating pace of 
technological change, the potential for obsolescence is raising new and unprecedented 
challenges (Holmstrom, 1989). In short, my study seeks to examine whether inside debt 
encourages corporate innovation.  
The key research question that the thesis addresses is whether CFO inside debt 
(pension and deferred compensation) influences investment in innovation. To answer 
this question, CFO inside debt compensation is regressed on R&D investment. Based on 
theoretical underpinnings that CFOs play a major role in corporate risk management and 
investment decision, I expect CFO inside debt compensation to have a significant 
influence on corporate investment in innovation.  
 
  
                                                   
3Finkelstein et al., (1988) describe the non-financial motivations of CEO in terms of CEO’s need for security 
and prestige among peers in the business community (which stem greatly from the financial stability of the 
firm). They believe that pay is a complex, but only partial motivator of CEOs. 
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1.3 Significance  
Innovation – in the form of developing new products and services – is important to 
firm growth. A survey4 by PwC of 1,200 CEOs from around the world finds that innovation, 
along with increasing the existing business, outstrips all other means of potential 
expansion, including moving into new markets, mergers and acquisitions, and joint 
ventures and other alliances. Previous studies (Cook, 1998 and Davis, 1997) suggest that 
innovation is essential in order to generate long-term stability, growth, shareholder 
returns, and sustainable performance and remain at the leading edge of the 
organization’s industry.  
The central role of innovation in firm performance and survival motivates me to 
examine the factors that drive management to increase investment in innovation. I 
examine whether managerial compensation matters in investment in corporate 
innovation, proxied by R&D expenditure. With regard to compensation I focus on inside 
debt. While conventional wisdom holds that executive compensation takes only two 
basic forms − cash and equity − a growing literature shows that top managers hold a 
significant amount of inside debt with claims against their own firm in the form of 
pensions and deferred compensation. Inside debt compensations are incentives that 
executives cannot liquidate before the end of their employment. Therefore, unlike pay 
for performance, inside debt does not compel managers to avoid long term risky 
investments in order to meet short-term earnings targets. This study is thus significant in 
that it adds to the literature on the impact of managers’ inside debt on firms’ long term 
investment and financial policies. 
                                                   
4http://www.pwc.co.nz/publications/demystifying-innovation/[accessed 15 February 2013] 
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The thesis differs from previous studies in two important ways. First, rather than 
assuming CEO dominance in corporate decision making, I focus on CFO incentives and 
their impact on long term corporate decision making. Second, in contrast to short-term 
performance based incentives, which have been the main focus of the existing literature, 
this study focuses on various types of inside debt compensation. Since inside debt ‘bonds’ 
executives to the long-term survival of the firm, the research finding may address the 
agency problem stemming from executive risk aversion.  
The research is also important because the use of inside debt as a form of executive 
compensation is widespread, and the extent of CFO inside debt holdings is often 
substantial. The ExecuComp data used in this study finds that on average CFO relative 
debt equity ratio is 40% in comparison to CEO relative debt equity ratio of 5%. My research 
findings will be of interest to researchers who investigate the incentive effects of 
executive compensation components, to investors (equity holders and debt holders) 
who wish to assess the extent to which executive preferences are aligned with their own, 
and to regulators who are interested in the effects that executive incentive packages can 
have on managerial behavior. 
 
1.4 Summary of major findings and contributions 
Based on a balanced sample of 1,025 firm-year observations representing 205 U.S. 
firms in the period 2006-2010, I find that both individually and after controlling for CEO 
inside debt, CFO relative inside debt has a significantly negative impact on firm 
innovation. Instead of encouraging innovation, relative inside debt appears to have a 
dampening effect on investment in innovation consistent with the higher degree of risk 
aversion.  
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However, when CFO inside debt is separated into its individual parts, i.e. pensions 
and deferred compensation, the results are rather mixed. When I control for endogenetiy 
in the relationship the results are at best weak. 
 
1.5 Thesis layout 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
background on innovation. Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature on the topic, while 
Chapter 4 develops the testable hypotheses. Chapter 5 describes the data and research 
method and Chapter 6 presents the main empirical results. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises 
and concludes this thesis.   
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Chapter 2: Innovation 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the fundamental features of innovation which are crucial to 
shareholder value maximization. It begins by defining the term ‘innovation’ followed by a 
rundown of the major characteristics of innovation and their significance to firms. 
 
2.2 The meaning of ‘innovation’ 
Innovation can be defined as new ideas for products or processes, or the 
introduction of something new which gives firms a competitive advantage. Innovation is 
concerned with the process of commercializing or extracting value from ideas; this is in 
contrast to ‘invention’ which need not directly be associated with commercialization 
(Rogers, 1998).While this definition of innovation may appear straightforward, a more 
precise definition involves consideration of a number of issues including the nature and 
type, stage and context, and aim of innovation (Baregheh et al., 2009).  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Schumpeter (1962) defines innovation as the setting up 
of a new production function. This definition includes five specific cases leading to a new 
production function, which includes: (1) the introduction of a new good; (2) the 
introduction of a new method of production; (3) the opening of a new market; (4) the 
conquest of a new source of supply of new materials; and (5) the carrying out of a new 
organization of any industry (creating a monopolistic position or the breaking up of a 
monopoly). The degree of newness is the most widely used phenomenon in defining 
innovation. For instance, Van de Ven et al. (1986) mention that as long as the idea is 
perceived as new to the people involved, it is an ‘innovation’ even though it may appear 
 
 
11 
 
to others to be an ‘imitation’ of something that exists elsewhere. Newness can be 
associated with change. Damanpour (1996) affirms that innovation is conceived of as a 
means of changing an organization, either as a response to changes in the external 
environment or as a pre-emptive action to influence the environment. Therefore, 
innovation entails carrying out something new or implementing some changes that 
introduce the existing thing in a new way. Additionally it also must be worthy of 
commercialization. 
Innovation is of interest across a range of fields including human resource 
management, operations management, entrepreneurship, R&D, information technology, 
engineering and product design, and marketing and strategy. Each of these fields defines 
innovation by aligning with its dominant pattern (Baregheh et al., 2009). For example, in 
knowledge management, the focus is on how knowledge is vital for innovation or the 
type of innovation. In technologically related definitions, the main focus is on innovation 
being a product related to new technology (Nord and Tucker, 1987). Therefore, the 
definition of innovation is diverse and varies across different fields. To come up with a 
generalized and integrative definition of innovation, Baregheh et al. (2009) conduct a 
content analysis of 60 multidisciplinary definitions to derive the key attributes, and to 
profile the descriptors used in relation to each attribute. They identify six different 
contexts of innovation: the nature, types, stages, social contexts, means, and aims of 
innovation. Based on these six aspects, they propose the following definition (p. 1334): 
“Innovation is the multi-stage process whereby organizations transform ideas into 
new/improved products, service or processes, in order to advance, compete and 
differentiate themselves successfully in their marketplace.” 
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While the definition may vary substantially, almost all studies on corporate 
innovation agree on its measurement, R&D expenditure and patents, possibly because 
these measures are easily available. For example, Clark et al. (1981) use patents; 
Trajtenberg (1990) uses R&D expenditure, patents, and patent citation; Francis et 
al.(1995) use R&D expenditure and patent awards; Hirschey and Richardson (2004) use 
R&D spending and the number of patents; Duguet et al. (2005) use patent citation; 
Tylecote and Ramirez (2006) use R&D intensity; and Becker-Blease (2011) use patent 
citations and R&D expenditure.  
The OECD (2010) defines R&D expenditure and patent as the input and output 
measures of innovation respectively. R&D is in fact the process towards innovation and 
patent is the outcome. In practice, 50% or more of R&D spending is on wages and salaries 
of highly educated scientists and engineers (Hall and Lerner, 2010). Their efforts create 
an intangible asset, the firm’s knowledge base, from which profits in future years will be 
generated. To the extent that this knowledge is ‘tacit’ rather than codified, it is 
embedded in the human capital of the firm’s employees and is therefore lost if they leave 
or are fired (Hall et al., 2002). 
 
2.3  Innovation and firm performance 
Innovation is important in the era of increasing competition and new technologies. 
It is essential in order to generate long-term stability, growth, shareholder returns, and 
sustainable performance and remain at the leading edge of the organization’s industry 
(Cook, 1998; Davis and Moe, 1997).    
Klomp and Van Leeuwen (1999) use a simultaneous-equations model to examine 
the association between innovation and firm performance. They measure firm 
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performance in terms of sales and employment growth, and hypothesize that the firm’s 
sales growth depends on the innovative output, firm size, industry, and an interaction 
term between industry and size. Findings suggest that even though total sales growth is 
positively influenced by the innovative output, the firm’s employment growth is not 
influenced by one of the variables in the equation. Further, innovative companies are 
found to outperform their non-innovative counterparts. 
Feeny and Rogers (2003) empirically investigate the link between innovation and 
firm performance using a sample of large Australian firms. They extend previous analyses 
by including trademark and design applications, in addition to R&D expenditure and 
patent applications, in the regression analysis. Their regression results indicate that R&D 
expenditure and patent applications are important determinants of the market value of a 
firm. Their study finds that innovation, on average, leads to increases in firm performance. 
In addition, they show that firms vary in their ability to capture the returns to innovation. 
Folkeringa et al. (2003) test the relationship between innovative output and firm 
performance. They measure firm performance by four different indicators: turnover 
growth, employment growth, profit, and productivity. They find turnover and 
employment growth are significantly related to innovation. Findings show a substantial 
difference between small and medium-sized firms. For small firms, the innovative output 
has a much larger impact on the turnover growth than for medium-sized firms. 
Using survey data from 845 Canadian manufacturing firms, Thornhill (2006) 
confirms that innovation is positively associated with firm performance, as measured by 
revenue growth. He finds that although innovation is more common in highly dynamic 
industries, it is positively associated with revenue growth, irrespective of the industry in 
which the innovative firms operates. 
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2.3  Characteristics of innovation 
Innovation has a number of attributes that make it distinct from ordinary 
investment. Innovation entails carrying out something new or implementing some 
changes that introduce the existing thing in a new way. It can be the introduction of a 
new good, new method of production, new market, new source of supply or a new 
organization. The newness can be associated with changes such as changing of an 
organization, either as a response to changes in the external environment or as a pre-
emptive action to influence the environment (Damanpour, 1996). Innovation is 
associated with commercialization. Rogers (1998) suggests that innovation is considered 
to have occurred only if it has been implemented or commercialized in some way. It gives 
firms a competitive advantage in a saturated or rapidly shifting market. In addition, 
consistent generation is another aspect of innovation. Bryant (1996, p.2) states 
“effectively innovating firms are those with strategies, values, organizational forms and 
practices which are conductive to consistent innovation and continuous improvement”.  
The most focal attribute of innovation is its long term risky nature. Innovation is a 
long term investment because the lag between the investment in innovation and the 
future revenues that the innovation investment generates is quite substantial. It is risky 
because the future benefit from the investment in innovation is highly uncertain, 
somewhat disorderly, and subject to changes of many sorts (Bierman and Dukes, 1975). 
The future net income stream resulting from an R&D project is subject to greater 
uncertainty with respect to the cost of the R&D project and the potential cash flows 
compared to an investment in say plant and equipment. R&D projects are subject to 
major uncertainty about both the probability of their scientific success and the cost 
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required for economically successful commercialization (Kothari et al., 2002). Even a 
successful scientific completion (e.g., a patent) does not ensure business profit and few 
patents eventually result in the production of a new profitable product.  
Bierman and Dukes (1975) reveal a different account of the uncertain outcome of 
R&D. In an early study on R&D cost, they examine Financial Accounting Standard No.2 
that requires “all research and development costs encompassed be charged to expense 
when incurred”. Based on previous literature, they conclude that Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB) overestimates the risk of future benefits from R&D investments. 
They argue that when looking at a company's R&D investment portfolio, the risks are far 
lower than for an individual project. However, no direct evidence is offered on the 
degree of risk of future benefits (e.g., earnings or cash flows) associated with R&D 
investments.  
In a later empirical study, Kothari et al. (2002) refute Bierman and Dukes’s (1975) 
argument and show that the outcome of innovation investment is highly uncertain. Using 
a sample of roughly 50,000 firm-year observations from COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial 
and Annual Research files for the period 1972-1997, their empirical analysis compares the 
relative contributions of current investments in R&D and Property, Plant and Equipment 
(PP&E) to future earnings variability (standard deviation of future earnings). They find 
that R&D investments generate future benefits that are far more uncertain than benefits 
from investments in PP&E. 
 
2.4  Chapter Summary 
 This chapter explained the key issues of innovation, crucial to my research. 
Innovation means introducing something new such as a product, service, or process 
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which brings positive changes to the firm. Fundamentally, while investment in innovation 
is long term and very risky in nature, it can potentially generate huge benefits for 
shareholders. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1  Introduction 
To examine the impact of executive compensation on corporate innovation, this 
chapter provides a review of relevant empirical and theoretical literature. I start with an 
examination of differing perspectives of executive compensation in the literature, which 
is fundamental to understanding the overall impact of executive incentives on innovation. 
This relationship is linked to agency theory, which relates to shareholder wealth/long 
term value maximization, loss aversion, and risk diversification. I then review the 
literature on inside debt compensation. Studies on inside debt compensation help 
pinpoint the motivations underlying executives’ decisions on long term risky investment 
such as investment in innovation. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on executive 
compensation and innovation. This is followed by Section 3.3, which discusses studies on 
inside debt compensation and financial outcomes. A summary of the major conclusions 
drawn from the extant literature is given in Section 3.4. 
 
3.2  Executive compensation and innovation 
Executive compensation has long attracted a great deal of attention from finance 
academics. Indeed, the increase in academic papers on the subject of executive 
compensation during the 1990s seems to have outpaced even the remarkable increase in 
executive pay itself during this period (Murphy, 1999). 
Hoskisson et al. (1993) investigate whether incentives for divisional CEOs in large 
firms affect their risk orientation and thus their decisions to invest in R&D. Results of a 
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study of 184 major U.S. firms suggest that incentives based on short-term (annual) 
divisional financial performance are negatively related to total firm R&D intensity after 
controlling for industry R&D intensity, firm diversification, size, and group structure. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that an emphasis on long-term financial incentives (i.e., 
stock and options) may mitigate the negative relationship between these incentives and 
R&D intensity. 
Based on a sample of 299 firm-product group observation, Holthausen et al. (1995) 
examine whether the structure of compensation for divisional CEO is related to 
subsequent innovative activity within the division, and whether the divisional CEO’s 
compensation is structured as a function of the expected innovation opportunity set 
facing the division. They treat both the expected innovation opportunity set and the 
divisional executive's compensation contract as endogenous variables by adopting a 
simultaneous equation approach. Using the United States patent citation and 
compensation data from Chi Research Inc., they find modest evidence that the 
proportion of total compensation tied to long-term components has a positive 
relationship with future innovation. 
Using a cross sectional study of changes in the compensation paid to CEOs of 1,249 
publicly traded U.S. firms from 1992 to 1993, Baber et al. (1995) examine the association 
between investment opportunities and the sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
accounting and market-based performance measures. They measure the firm’s 
investment activity by the sum of acquisitions, R&D and capital expenditure. They find 
that investment opportunities are associated with a greater sensitivity market-based 
compensation to accounting-based performance measures.  
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Balkin et al. (2000) investigate the relationship between innovation and CEO pay 
for high-technology firms. They use the resource based view of firm and agency theory, 
which states that firms are heterogeneous in terms of the resources they control. They 
use two sets of sample. Their control sample consists of 74 non-high-technology firm 
listed in the Forbes 1994-95 special issue. The high-technology sample consists of 90 
electronics and health science firms. Using a hierarchical regression model, they find that 
CEO short-term compensation, not long-term compensation, is positively related to 
innovation as measured by the number of patents and R&D expenditure. Their findings 
also suggest that a less consistent temporal relationship exists between innovation and 
long term CEO compensation in high-technology firms. Their control sample of non-high-
technology firms shows no relationship between innovation and either short or long 
term CEO pay. 
Eng and Shackell (2001) find no evidence that long-term performance plans have 
implications for R&D spending. Using two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regressions, they 
examine the impact of managerial incentives and institutional ownership on long-term 
investment, as measured by R&D expenditures. Examining the long-term management 
performance plans for a sample of U.S. firms that adopted performance plans between 
1981 and 1989, they find no evidence that changes in managerial incentives affect R&D 
investments. Nevertheless, institutional investor groups have a positive influence on the 
level of R&D spending in the firm. 
Ryan and Wiggins (2002) use a system of equations to investigate the endogenous 
relation between R&D investment and CEO compensation. Their sample consists of 1,088 
U.S. firms for the fiscal year 1997. Using ExecuComp as their source of compensation 
data, they find that stock options positively affect R&D expenditure while restricted 
 
 
20 
 
stock has a negative influence. These results suggest that CEO compensation should 
balance incentive alignment and efficient risk sharing with risk-averse managers. 
Additionally, their analysis suggests that institutional ownership directly influences R&D 
expenditure by providing managerial oversight and indirectly by influencing the 
compensation policy. 
Xue (2007) labels innovation strategy from two different perspectives: ‘make’ and 
‘buy’ approaches. Companies innovate either through in-house research and 
development (R&D), i.e. a ‘make’ strategy, or through external acquisitions and licensing 
i.e. a ‘buy’ strategy. He examines the differential implications of accounting-based and 
stock-based performance measures for managers’ incentive in choosing between the 
two strategies. Using probit, OLS, and 2SLS regressions on a sample of U.S. high tech 
companies, he finds that CEOs receiving relatively more accounting-based compensation 
tend to acquire technology externally instead of growing it internally through R&D. In 
contrast, when CEO compensation contracts are skewed towards stock-based pay, firms 
pursue innovation through both approaches.  
Lerner and Wulf (2007) examine the impact of the compensation of the heads of 
corporate R&D on patent citations using an unbalanced panel data of more than 300 
publicly traded U.S. firms for the years 1987 to 1998. Their statistics show that the 
compensation of corporate R&D heads changed dramatically over the course of the 
1990s, with much greater use of long-term incentives (restricted stock and stock options). 
The ratio of the value of long-term incentives to cash compensation for corporate R&D 
heads more than doubled over the period from 1988 (0.39) to 1998 (0.87). The value of 
long-term incentives more than tripled over the period from USD136,867 to USD416,720 
(in 1996 dollars). Using compensation data collected from a confidential compensation 
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survey conducted by Hewitt Associates, a leading human resources consulting firm 
specializing in executive compensation and benefits, and patent data from NBER Patent 
Database, they find that among firms with centralized R&D organizations in which the 
corporate R&D head has greater firm-wide authority over R&D decision, a clear 
relationship emerges: more long-term incentives (stock options and restricted stock) are 
associated with more heavily cited patents than short term incentives (salary and bonus). 
These incentives appear to be somewhat associated with more patent filings and patents 
of greater generality. 
Sanyal and Bulan (2010) investigate whether aligning manager and owner 
incentives can improve the innovation performance of firms.  Using NBER Patent 
Database and ExecuComp data from 1993 to 2005, they find that equity linked 
compensation works to align managerial actions to shareholder interests. As managerial 
wealth becomes more sensitive to the firm’s stock price, the innovation performance of 
a firm improves. Entrenched managers, however, are more likely to act myopically and 
follow strategies that result in a large number of low quality patents. They also find that 
short-term cash incentives have little impact on innovation. Longer managerial tenure 
increases the probability of R&D spending and innovation quality, and thus better aligns 
the managers’ actions with a firm’s long-term goals. CEO control of the firm, however, 
decreases innovation performance. 
Fong (2010) addresses the behavioural issues relating to the influence of relative 
CEO underpayment on the reduction in R&D spending. Using a hierarchical linear 
modelling on a sample of 621 observations from 227 CEOs, results suggest that relative 
CEO underpayment is associated with reductions in R&D spending in low R&D intensive 
industries, but increases in R&D spending in high R&D intensive industries. Also, greater 
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relative CEO underpayment leads to greater reductions in R&D spending in manager-
controlled organizations as compared to owner-controlled organizations. 
Manso (2011) shows that motivation for investment in innovation requires both 
tolerance to early failure and reward for long term success. The author proposes a 
framework to study the incentives for innovation. In this framework, innovation is the 
result of learning through the exploration of untested approaches that are likely to fail. 
Because of that, the optimal incentive scheme that motivates exploration is 
fundamentally different from the standard pay-for performance scheme used to 
motivate effort. He argues that tolerance (or even reward) for early failure, reward for 
long-term success, excessive continuation, commitment to a long-term incentive plan, 
and timely feedback on performance are all important ingredients to motivate 
innovation. The optimal incentive scheme that motivates innovation can be implemented 
via a combination of stock options with long vesting periods, option re-pricing, golden 
parachutes, and managerial entrenchment. 
Francis et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and 
innovation. Using a broad sample of 1,106 firms during 1992–2005, they employ a 
negative binomial model and OLS regression. Their measures of innovation are the 
number of patents filed and citations to patents, which come from the NBER patent data 
file (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001). Unlike Lerner and Wulf (2007) who regard 
innovation as a performance benchmark for R&D executives, they treat innovation as a 
real option for CEOs. The empirical examination of compensation contracts of S&P 400, 
500, and 600 firms confers that their measures of compensation, which enforce long-
term commitment, including new options grants and previously granted unvested and 
vested options, have a positive relationship with patents and patent citations. In addition, 
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the convexity of options has a positive effect on innovation. They also find no 
relationship between pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) with patents and patent 
citations, a positive relationship between the innovation measures and golden 
parachutes. Their results provide support for the theory that compensation contracts 
that offer long-term commitment and protection from failure have a positive effect on 
innovation. 
In summary, the above studies generally find that the relationship between CEO 
compensation and innovation is a positive one. However, all of the above studies do not 
investigate the impact of CFO inside debt on innovation. This is the aim of my thesis. 
 
3.3  Inside debt  
 Inside debt as a form of executive remuneration is widespread in the U.S.. It tends 
to take the shape of deferred compensation, most notably in the form of defined 
pensions (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Wei and Yermack, 2011). Defined pensions are 
debt like compensation, where companies promise fixed sums of money at some future 
point in time such as, retirement or cessation of job. The value of deferred compensation , 
another form of ‘inside debt’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), can also make up a substantial 
share of CEO’s overall remuneration. Wei and Yermack (2011) report that more than two-
thirds of CEOs of S&P 1500 firms hold some form of inside debt, and that for those who 
hold inside debt, the holdings were worth an average of $5.7 million in 2006. 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) define pension and deferred compensation as debt 
like compensations because executives having this type of compensation are unsecured 
and lose their payment at bankruptcy. However, some of the studies (Bebchuk and Fried 
2004, Bebchuk and Jackson 2005) question this assumption. They argue that the benefits 
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of the U.S. pensions and deferred compensation are secured either fully or partially 
which make their payoffs less debt-like. The regulation of Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act 1974 (ERISA) requires the defined benefit pension to be insured by Pension 
Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) which insures roughly 85% of workers' pension 
benefits (Bicksler & Chen, 1985). It distinguishes pensions plans between rank-and-file 
(RAF) employees (non executive and non managerial employees) and the most highly 
paid executives. If any firm goes bankrupt with an underfunded pension plan, the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)5 funds the deficit of RAF pension plans, up 
to a maximum limit reset by law annually ($54,000 per beneficiary, as of 2011)6. The top 
executives’ pension balances in RAF plans are therefore secured up to that level. Because 
the maximum level of RAF plan is limited to some level ($195,000 annually in 2011), many 
firms set up Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs) to accrue benefits for top 
executives. As SERPs are not necessary to be secured, they expose top executives to the 
risk of loss at bankruptcy and therefore resemble more closely to the unsecured 
debtholders than the payoffs of RAF plans (Anantharaman et al., 2011). However, there is 
considerable heterogeneity in SERP contracts. Some firms allow top executives to take a 
lump-sum pension payout at or before their retirement, allowing their claims to be senior 
to the claims of unsecured debtholders. Some firms may voluntarily trust funds to shield 
executives’ pension assets. Therefore, pension plans can be termed as inside debt not 
because of the executive’s loss of payment at bankruptcy but because of their similarity 
to the pattern of payoffs to debtholders. Deferred compensation plans, on the other 
hand, have some features different from pensions plans. Under this plan, executives 
voluntarily defer current compensation and agree to withdraw later, on a pre-specified 
                                                   
5 http://www.pbgc.gov/ [accessed 15 November 2013] 
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pension_Benefit_Guaranty_Corporation [accessed 20 November 2013] 
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schedule. Unlike, defines pension plans, deferred compensations are not required to be 
secured under ERISA law, therefore can be unsecured and unfunded. This exposes 
executives to lose their deferred compensation payment at default of the firm. Therefore, 
there is considerable variation among the unsecured and secured portion of inside debt 
of a company.  
A limited number of studies on executive compensation investigate the impact of 
inside debt on long term risky investment. In an early study, Eaton and Rosen (1983) 
examine the factors affecting the structure of executives’ compensation package. They 
focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of 
‘bonding’ executives to the firm for the long-run interest of shareholders. The basic 
criteria used in their study are the willingness and consequences of taking risks by the 
executives. Using compensation data of high-ranked U.S. executives during 1970-1973, 
they find that shares of salary-bonus and pensions in the compensation package are 
larger for those firms in which R&D expenditures are high.  
Gaver and Gaver (1995) investigate differences in the level of executive 
compensation between growth and non-growth firms. They conclude that executives of 
growth firms receive a larger portion of their compensation from long-term incentive 
compensation, while those of non-growth firms receive a larger portion of their pay from 
fixed salary. However, CEOs of growth firm do not derive a significantly higher 
proportion of their pay from stock-based incentive compensation. In this regard, they 
state (p. 30) that “Inclusion of deferred compensation (such as retirement benefits) in 
the analysis could also fine-tune the results as could consideration of executives' tax 
incentives.” 
 
 
26 
 
Grossman and Hoskisson (1998) consider a deferred compensation plan to be 
appropriate for companies pursuing long term strategies. They provide an intellectual 
background to better understand the potential effect of incentive compensation on 
executive decision making horizon. They offer some credible suggestions on how those 
involved in the design and implementation of executive compensation contracts (e.g., 
boards of directors, compensation consultants, major shareholders, executives, and 
public policy makers) can better manage the tension between strategy, performance, 
and compensation. Their finding suggests that if short-term accounting performance is 
the goal, then firms might adopt an annual bonus scheme. If long term market 
performance is the objective, however, the firm might grant restricted shares or stock 
options and deferred compensation. They find that deferred compensation plan is 
appropriate for companies pursuing intermediate- or long-term strategies. 
Tung and Wang (2011) offer a new approach to investigating the link between 
banker debt-like compensation and bank performance prior to and during the Global 
Financial Crisis. They use two alternative proxies for CEOs’ inside debt incentives: CEO 
personal inside debt-equity ratio and CEO relative incentive ratio; the latter is the CEO’s 
personal inside debt-equity ratio over the bank’s debt-equity ratio, adjusted to account 
for the differing convexity and duration of options versus stock. Using 2006 
compensation data for a sample of 83 bank CEOs from the ExecuComp database, they 
find that bank CEOs’ inside debt holdings preceding the crisis are significantly positively 
associated with stock returns and accounting returns on assets (ROA), as measured from 
July 2007 through the end of 2008. They also show a significantly negative association 
between CEOs’ inside debt incentives and a number of measures of bank risk taking 
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during the crisis. They argue in support of using inside debt compensation to curb the 
excessive risk taking of the banks which was the cause of the crisis. 
Using a large sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2006 through 2008, Lee and Tang 
(2011) examine the main determinants of inside debt compensation and the relative 
strength of inside debt and equity compensation balances. They find that powerful CEOs, 
as measured by a larger board, CEO/chair duality, and a higher degree of anti-takeover 
provisions (ATPs), are more likely to obtain higher compensation through the use of 
inside debt. In addition, as the probability of bankruptcy increases, CEO compensation 
exhibits a higher balance of inside debt compared to equity incentives, such as stock and 
stock option holdings. Their results also indicate that the higher the ratio of inside debt-
to-equity balances of CEOs, the less likely their respective firms are associated with risky 
corporate policy choices. 
Cassell et al. (2012) investigate the impact of inside debt (pension benefits and 
deferred compensation) on different forms of risk taking. Their sample consists of 2,994 
firm-year observations with complete compensation and financial data from 2006 
through 2008. Using OSL and 2SLS regressions, they find a negative association between 
CEO inside debt holdings and R&D expenditures. Their results provide strong empirical 
evidence suggesting that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings prefer investment and 
financial policies that are less risky. Therefore, inside debt suppresses innovation. 
Finally, Eisdorfer et al. (2012) examine how the similarity between the executive 
compensation leverage ratio and the firm leverage ratio affects the quality of firm 
investment.7 Using extensive hand-collected data on top executives’ pension plans in 
                                                   
7Using ExecuComp data they measure compensation leverage as: 
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large companies, they find two outcomes. First, the absolute difference between 
compensation leverage and firm leverage increases the extent of the investment 
distortion i.e., the extent to which firm’s actual investment deviates from the expected 
investment policy. Further examination reveals managers who are compensated with 
more debt-like components (relative to firm leverage) tend to under-invest, while 
managers with more equity-based compensation components tend to over-invest. 
Second, investment distortion, and particularly overinvestment, is more likely to increase 
the value of the firm’s equity when the proportion of the equity-like component in the 
manager’s compensation is larger than the proportion of the firm’s assets that financed 
by equity. 
 
3.4  Chapter summary 
Prior research addresses the question of whether executive compensation affects 
corporate risk taking. The chief empirical findings directly relevant to my study are that 
executives with more long term incentives prefer investment and financial policies that 
are less risky. 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
 Compensation Leverage = 
1
𝐽𝐽
∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
∑ (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑗𝑗 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑗𝑗 + 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑗𝑗 )𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 , where J represents the number of top managers. 
They calculate firm leverage as book value of long term debt to book value of total asset.  
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Chapter 4: TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter develops a testable hypothesis which is empirically examined in this 
study. To provide some insight into the impact of executive compensation on innovation, 
I focus on CFO compensation and corporate innovation. 
 
4.2  Inside debt and innovation 
Agency conflicts of debt arise when managers increase firm risk (e.g., through 
firm investment and financial policies) in ways that benefit shareholders at the expense 
of debt holders (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Debt holders prefer firms to be more 
conservative because debt holdings are characterized by an asymmetric payoff function 
with respect to the firm’s net assets (Watts, 2003). While payoffs are fixed (at the 
nominal interest rate) when firm performance is good, debt holders face substantial risk 
if firm performance is poor, the extreme case being when the firm goes bankrupt. 
In the arrangement of pensions and deferred compensation, together called 
inside debt, firms promise to pay executives fixed payments at or after retirement. 
Pension benefits, even though they can be negotiated, usually accrue to managers under 
company-specific formulae depending on executives’ number of years of service and 
level of cash compensation. On retirement, executives can draw the pension as a life 
annuity or a lump sum amount which equals the actuarially calculated present value of 
expected lifetime benefits. Deferred compensation, on the other hand, accrues when 
executives make a discretionary investment decision to lend money back to the firm by 
foregoing cash compensation that they would otherwise be entitled to receive while 
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they are in service (in some cases, these deferral decisions are mandatory). There are 
different ways deferred compensation can be invested, including at a fixed rate of return, 
in the company’s stock, or in the company’s preferred mutual fund. Many companies are 
flexible on how the executive deferred compensation be invested. Like pensions, 
deferred compensation is also generally paid out to executives at retirement. These 
promised future payments, often unfunded and unsecured, resemble debt claims against 
the firm (Anantharaman et al., 2011). 
 Agency theory conjectures that when an executive’s compensation consists of 
both debt-like claims and equity claims on the firm, their incentives vary with the relative 
importance of debt- versus equity-based compensation in their pay structure (Edmans 
and Liu, 2010). The higher the executives’ inside leverage relative to firm leverage, the 
more closely their incentives are aligned with debtholders and the lesser the degree to 
which they engage in risk-taking to the detriment of debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Because inside debt compensations are debt like obligations, and payable at a 
future date, executives (like outside creditors) face asymmetric payoffs with respect to 
firm performance. This unique characteristic makes executives take an investment 
approach for the company which is conservative in nature and ensures smooth payoffs.  
Innovation is a highly risky investment in nature (Cassell et al., 2012). The future 
payoffs from investment in innovation are uncertain as one cannot predict when they will 
start generating revenue, if at all. Initial outlay for innovation is often very substantial. 
Besides, the innovators cannot rest on success forever because the innovation is likely to 
spill over to rivals after a given period.  For these reasons, it is conceivable that managers 
with high levels of inside debt in their compensation will be wary of investing in such 
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risky project since its failure will have direct adverse consequence to their personal 
wealth as inside debts are often unsecured claims on the firm  
It is now well established that CFOs play a central role in corporate risk 
management and investment decision making. Decades ago, the role of the CFO was to 
keep the financial records, and had accounting, internal control, budgeting, and treasury 
responsibilities. This traditional role of the CFO has changed over the years and has 
become much more comprehensive to include decision-making that extends beyond the 
accounting and treasury functions (Fabozzi et al., 2008). CFOs are no longer only 
providing input into the strategy development process but are also helping to drive this 
process and are becoming strategists themselves (Fabozzi et al., 2008). Favaro (2011, p. 6) 
states “CFO’s primary job used to be telling the boss where they have been; now it is to 
help figure out where they are going.” The modern CFO not only makes the investment 
decision constituting innovation but also performs the vital role in risk management. 
Provided that inside debt has substantial bearing on risky investment in innovation, CFOs 
with inside debt compensation should have a significant impact on innovation. Therefore, 
 
H1: CFOs with higher inside debt holdings invest less in innovation. 
 
4.3  Chapter Summary 
This chapter developed the only testable hypothesis of the thesis. It predicts that 
CFO inside debt reduces investment in innovation. As the payoffs of inside debt 
compensation (pensions and deferred compensations) resemble the debt payoffs of the 
firm, inside debt aligns the executives’ interest with the debtholders. It is well 
established that debtholders prefer firms to be more conservative rather than to take 
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high risk. Therefore, innovation as a highly risky investment strategy is not in the interest 
of executives when they hold a substantial amount of inside debt in their compensation.  
Recent literature brings into light the increasing importance of CFOs in firm investment 
decision making, which includes innovation investment. Therefore, this chapter predicts 
that CFOs inside debt compensation reduces investment in innovation.  
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Chapter 5: Data and Research Method 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the sample and research method used to test the hypothesis 
developed in Chapter 4. It begins with a discussion of data collection procedure and data 
sources in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the measurement of variables. Section 5.4 
provides descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. Section 5.5 outlines the 
empirical model to test the relationship between innovation and inside debt. A chapter 
summary is provided in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Data 
The primary dataset consists of a balanced panel of U.S. firms for the period between 
2006 and 2010. The sample period begins in 2006 because the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) expanded the new disclosure rule on executive compensation in proxy 
statements to include tabular disclosure of the present value of pension and deferred 
compensation from this year onward. Data on executive compensation including salary, 
bonus, total compensation, pensions, and deferred compensation are firstly collected 
from the Annual Compensation Table of Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. I 
identify CEO and CFO by CEOANN and CFOANN from this database. The data from 
ExecuComp are matched with Stock Option Grants-1992 Format table to obtain data on 
stock options. The compensation dataset is then matched with Compustat’s Fundament 
Annual database, which provides data on R&D expenses (defined by column ‘xrd’ in 
ExecuComp data base) and other firm characteristics.  
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In accordance with Halford and Qiu (2012), firms in the consumer staples (GICS code 
30) and finance (GICS code 40) sectors are removed due to the relatively low propensity 
of R&D in these industries (less than 1% of total R&D). To reduce the noise introduced by 
heterogeneity in data, firms which do not have R&D or inside debt information over the 
whole period of interest, are removed. This matching procedure results in a balanced 
sample of 1,025 firm-year observations representing 205 unique U.S. firms spanning from 
2006 to 2010.  
 
5.3 Research Method 
To test my hypothesis, I employ the following fixed-effects panel regression model: 
Innovation𝑃𝑃 ,𝑆𝑆 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽1Inside debt ratio𝑃𝑃 ,𝑆𝑆 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=2 +  𝜀𝜀𝑃𝑃 ,𝑆𝑆 .         (1)  
The analysis takes advantage of panel structure of data, which gives information on both 
cross-sectional differences between firms and temporal changes within firms. To 
mitigate the influence of extreme values, and in line with most research, all variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99%. To derive statistical significance, I use ‘robust’ standard 
errors clustered at firm level (unique gvkey). 
 
5.4 Measurement of Variables 
5.4.1 Innovation 
Innovation is proxied by R&D intensity, measured as the firm’s reported R&D 
expenditure (item ‘xrd’ in COMPUSTAT) over total assets (item ‘at’ in COMPUSTAT) 
relative to industry total R&D expenditure over industry total asset in a given year. I scale 
the firm’s R&D by the industry R&D because the level of R&D varies across industry. R&D 
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expenditures reflect only the investment in the inputs supporting the innovation process. 
Traditionally, the literature regards investment in R&D as one of the key strategies to 
secure the potential for innovation and economic growth. Mairesse et al. (2010) find R&D 
expenditure is positively correlated with all measures of innovation output and, all other 
things equal, is more correlated than firm size to innovation. Using a quantile approach, 
Ebersberger et al. (2010) show R&D expenditure in general has a positive impact on 
innovative performance with decreasing returns. There is little doubt that there exists a 
positive correlation between R&D expenditure and firm-level innovation performance, 
not only directly but also through higher levels of vertical and institutional cooperation 
(see, for example, Cohen (1995) and Mairesse and Mohnen (2002)). While theoretically I 
could use patents and patent citations as an indicator of innovation output, in practice 
few innovations become patents. Further, the importance of patents varies across 
industries and few service firms have patents (Griliches 1990). In addition, NBER U.S. 
Patent Citations data are not available for the 2006-2010 period, the time period for 
which I have CFO compensation data. Therefore, while acknowledging any potential 
shortcomings from using just one proxy for my main variable, I use R&D intensity to 
proxy for innovation. 
 
5.4.2  Inside debt  
Following the existing literature (Edmans and Liu, 2011; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; 
Anatharaman, Fang and Gong, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011), the explanatory variable of 
interest is the executive’s relative debt equity ratio, which I measure for both the CFO 
and the CEO. I perform the tests using three alternative measures, in line with the 
number of proxies for executive relative debt equity ratio in previous studies. My first 
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measure is the debt equity ratio of the executive relative to the debt equity ratio of the 
firm, as per Wei and Yermack (2011): 
 
Executive inside debt = (IDH/EH)(FD/FE) .                 (2) 
 
IDH, the executive’s inside debt holding, is the sum of the present value of pension and 
deferred compensation (denoted by data item ‘pension_value_tot’ and 
‘defer_balance_tot’ from ExecuComp). EH, the executive’s equity holding is the sum of 
the fair value of the executive’s direct stock holding, stock option holding, and unvested 
restricted stock holding. The value of direct stock holding is calculated by multiplying the 
number of shares held by the executive and the firm’s stock price (column ‘prcc_f’ from 
Compustat) at the end of the fiscal year. The value of unvested restricted stock holdings 
comes directly from ExecuComp (column ‘stock_unvest_val’). The executive’s debt 
equity ratio (IDH/EH) is scaled by firm’s debt equity ratio (FD/FE), where the firm’s debt 
(FD) is the sum of long term debt (data item ‘dltt’ from Compustat) and current liabilities 
(data item ‘dlc’ from Compustat), and the firm’s equity is the number of common shares 
outstanding (data item ‘csho’ from Compustat) times the stock price at the end of the 
fiscal year (data item ‘prcc_f’ from Compustat).  
 My second measure, a dichotomous variable of “executive inside debt>1” is set to 
“1” if the executive’s inside debt from equation (2) is greater than one and “0” otherwise. 
Edman and Liu (2010) indicate that intuitively executive inside debt ratio exceeding one 
refers to a debt incentive bias while executive relative debt equity ratio less than one 
suggests an equity incentive bias. 
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 A probable limitation of my first two measures is that they depend on the level 
rather than the change in the value of debt or equity. To circumvent this problem, Wei 
and Yermack (2011) adopt a measure called the relative incentive ratio. It captures the 
ratio of the marginal change in the executive’s debt and the marginal change in her 
equity holdings, divided by the marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal 
change in its equity, given a dollar change in the overall value of the firm. This ratio is as 
follows: 
 
Executive relative incentive = (ΔIDH/ΔEH)(ΔFD/ΔFE) .                        (3) 
 
Following Wei and Yermack (2011) and Cassell et al. (2012), I adopt a simplifying 
assumption that ΔIDH≈IDH and ΔFD≈FD. The argument is that based on the rationale that 
since a large majority of S&P 1500 firms are not financially distressed, each of these 
quantities (ΔIDH and ΔFD) will be small and problematic to estimate. Besides, the 
COMPUSTAT database does not provide the maturity structure of corporate debt since 
U.S. firms are not required to disclose details on the maturity of debt with a remaining 
life of more than five years. ΔEH, sometimes called the total delta, is constructed as 
follows: 
 
ΔEH = S +∑ Nii (ΔNi).                  (4) 
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where S is the executive’s total share delta, equals the number of shares held times an 
assumed delta of 1.0; ∑ Nii (ΔNi) is the executive’s total option delta 8,where Ni is the 
number of options in tranche i; and ΔNi is the option delta of tranche i. The calculation of 
ΔFE follows the same approach as ΔEH, where S is the number of common shares 
outstanding (data item ‘csho’ from Compustat) times an assumed delta of 1.0; Ni is the 
number of options outstanding at the end of the year (data item ‘optosey’ from 
Compustat); and ΔNi is the total option delta of the firm. 
 
5.4.3 Control variables 
In testing H1, I control for a number of variables that a priori explain corporate 
innovation. First, I control for current compensation. Core & Guay (1999) argue that CEOs 
with higher total cash compensation are better diversified as they have more money to 
invest outside the firm, and therefore invest more in R&D. Cassell et al. (2012) use the 
natural logarithm of current compensation to proxy for the level of CEO’s outside wealth. 
Current executive compensation is the summation of data item ‘salary’ and ‘bonus’ from 
ExecuComp database by the total compensation (data item ‘tdc1’ in ExecuComp).  
Following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), I control for cash surplus (Cash) to 
account for the availability of funding for investment in new projects. Cash surplus (Cash) 
is measured by cash flow from operations (data item ‘oancf’ from Compustat) less 
depreciation and amortization expense (item ‘dpc’) plus research and development 
expenditure (item ‘xrd’), scaled by total assets (item ‘at’).  
Leverage has a multidimensional effect on firm’s future investment. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) show a firm’s investment policy may change in the presence of risky 
                                                   
8 Option delta= (Δ Option Value/Δ Price)*(Price/100)=e-dt N(Z) * (Price/100) 
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debt. Debtholders want firm to hold less risky investment to minimize the default risk. 
Therefore, high leverage is expected to reduce the risky investment in R&D. Using a 
sample of 392 large U.S. manufacturing corporations, Singh & Faircloth (2005) suggest 
that it is higher leverage that leads to lower R&D expenditure, rather than R&D 
expenditure causing variations in future leverage. I measure leverage by the ratio of the 
firm’s debt measured by the summation of long term debt (data item ‘dltt’)  and current 
liabilities (data item ‘dlc’) to equity measured by number of common share (item ‘csho’) 
multiplied by price of each share (item ‘prccf’). 
Following prior research, I control for liquidity constraint in the regression. Using 
firm-level data for R&D active manufacturing firms, Bougheas et al. (2003) find that R&D 
investments are in fact financially constrained. Because of the risky nature and lack of 
tangible assets, outside investors are reluctant to finance R&D (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Hall (1993) looks at the relationship between R&D investment and cash flow in a large 
panel of manufacturing firms, and finds strong evidence of the effect of liquidity 
constraints on R&D. Liquidity constraint is measured by a binary variable equals one if 
operating cash flow of the firm i.e., the ExecuComp data item ‘oancf’<0 and zero 
otherwise.  
While neoclassical economics argues that small firms are uniquely suited to 
promote technological change, Schumpeter (1962) argues that large firms may have 
greater resources to develop sustained R&D programs and exploit innovation. Large 
firms tend to be shielded from competitive pressures and are thus better able to 
internalize the benefits of R&D investments. Moreover, large firms enjoy greater 
economies of scale than small firms. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) find a positively 
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significant effect of firm size on R&D intensity. I measure firm size (Log (Total asset)) as 
the natural logarithm of total assets (column ‘at’ from COMPUSTAT).  
The tax status of high and low R&D firms is likely to differ. High R&D firms tend to 
be younger and smaller than low R&D firms. Both of these factors are linked to tax status 
(Scholes and Wolfson, 1990). Young firms are subject to face net operating loss and 
therefore require tax loss carry forward. Tax loss carried forward allows the firm to 
forward the tax expenses to one of the later income years, therefore motivate R&D 
expenditure. I incorporate a dummy variable (tax) coded as one if the firm had a tax loss 
carried forward (item ‘tlcf’), and zero otherwise. 
Research finds that growth firms are likely to value future investment more than 
the value from assets in place (Gaver and Gaver, 1995). A firm’s growth opportunity is 
made up of two distinct components: the expected positive NPV projects and investment 
opportunities. Following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), I use market to book value of 
the assets (M2B) as a proxy for investment opportunity. This value equals the market 
value of equity (item ‘csho’ multiplied by ‘prcc_f’), divided by the book values of assets 
(item ‘ceq’) for the fiscal year just ended.  
Prior studies find that previous firm performance has a substantial effect on R&D 
expenditure (Barker & Mueller, 2002). The effect is twofold. Some of the companies 
respond to declining profit by cutting R&D spending. This response is supported by 
Hundley et al. (1996) who find that U.S. firms reduce R&D when unprofitable. In contrast, 
firms increase R&D investment during downturn to signal long-term viability of the firm. 
The later response is supported by Mensch (1979). I use past operating performance 
(ROA), measured by the firm’s current after-tax return on assets (item ‘roa’), and stock 
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Name of Industry Firm year Percentage 
Frequency
10 Energy 35 3%
15 Materials 150 15%
20 Industrials 305 30%
25 Consumer Discretionary 125 12%
35 Health Care 175 17%
45 Information Technology 225 22%
50 Telecommunication Services 10 1%
Total 1025 100%
GIC 
Sector
return (Stock return), measured as the change in stock price from (item ‘prcc_f’) the 
previous year. The data are taken from COMPUSTAT. 
A firm with significant market power may be able to expropriate economic rents, 
which provides it with the incentives to invest heavily in R&D (Ryan & Wiggins, 2002). 
Market power is measured by Herfindahl index (HHI) of the four-digit SIC code for the 
primary industry by which each firm is classified in the COMPUSTAT database.9 The 
Herfindahl index is calculated asHHI = 1 − marketsharei2 , where market share is the 
proportion of the firm’s sales revenue in the industry.  
Finally, , firm, year and industry fixed effects are used to control for unobserved 
firm-specific, macroeconomic and industry-specific characteristics, respectively. 
 
5.5 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows that R&D investments are mostly concentrated in the Industrials (30%) and 
Information Technology (22%) sectors, with the lowest concentration (1%) in the 
Telecommunication Services sector.  
Table 1: Sample Distribution by Industry 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. The mean value of R&D 
expenditure to total asset is 1%, which is small in comparison to the 6% in Francis et al. 
                                                   
9For details on Herfindahl Index, see Kwoka (1985) 
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(2011) for a pre-crisis sample period of 1992-2006. The mean (median) firm size is $9 
billion ($2.2 billion). The mean executive inside debt ratio is 14.06 for CFOs and 2.88 for 
CEOs. In contrast, the executive relative incentive ratio, which measures the marginal 
change in debt, is similar for both CFOs (4.79) and CEOs (4.62). The average market to 
book ratio (M2B) and stock returns are 2.93 and 0.15 respectively, similar to those 
reported by Cassell et al. (2012). 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations between the primary variables of interest. 
As expected, the correlation between my proxies for inside debt is quite high, ranging 
from 44% to 75%. The significant negative correlation between the dependent variable 
(R&D to total asset) and my key explanatory variable (executive inside debt) provides 
preliminary support for my hypothesis. The correlations between my independent 
variables are quite small and do not raise concerns for potential multicollinearity problem 
in the regressions. 
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Mean Std. dev Q1 Median Q3
R&D exp/Total asset 1.00 0.65 0.64 0.96 1.21
CFO inside debt 14.06 40.48 0.00 1.17 8.78
CEO inside debt 2.18 5.16 0.00 0.35 1.79
CFO relative incentive 4.79 15.26 0.00 0.42 3.11
CEO relative incentive 4.62 13.74 0.00 0.57 3.09
CFO current compensation 0.32 0.17 0.20 0.27 0.41
CEO current  compensation 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.31
Cash 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.14
Leverage 0.43 0.95 0.10 0.21 0.40
Liquidity constraint 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total asset 9012.85 17064.12 878.69 2224.27 7167.00
Tax 0.91 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.00
M2B 2.93 3.31 1.58 2.31 3.57
Stock return 0.15 0.68 -0.25 0.06 0.34
ROA 3.75 12.35 2.33 5.46 8.71
HHI 0.59 0.29 0.35 0.52 0.82
Table 2.Descriptive statistics 
 
This table provides basic descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. R&D exp/Total asset is scaled by 
industry R&D exp/Total asset. Executive inside debt is the ratio of executive debt equity ratio and firm debt 
equity ratio. Executive relative incentive is the marginal change in the executive’s debt and the marginal 
change in her equity holdings, divided by the marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal change 
in its equity, given a dollar change in the overall value of the firm.  Executive current compensation is 
scaled by executive total compensation. Cash is the cash flow from operations less depreciation plus R&D 
expenditure scaled by total assets. Leverage is the firm debt to equity ratio. Total asset is the total asset of 
firm in corresponding year. Tax is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a tax loss carry forward, and 
zero otherwise. M2B is the market value of equity divided by book value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current 
after-tax return on assets and stock return as change in stock price from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 − market sharei2, where i is the number of firms in the industry and market share is the proportion 
of firm’s sales in industry. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix  
This table presents the Pearson correlation between the variables of interest. R&D exp/Total asset is scaled by industry R&D exp/Total asset. Executive inside debt is 
the ratio of executive debt equity ratio and firm debt equity ratio. Executive relative incentive is the marginal change in the executive’s debt and the marginal change 
in her equity holdings, divided by the marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal change in its equity, given a dollar change in the overall value of the firm.  
Executive current compensation is scaled by executive total compensation. Cash is the cash flow from operations less depreciation plus R&D expenditure scaled by 
total assets. Leverage is the firm debt to equity ratio. Total asset is the total asset of firm in corresponding year. Tax is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a 
tax loss carry forward, and zero otherwise. M2B is the market value of equity divided by book value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current after-tax return on assets and 
stock return as change in stock price from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 − market sharei2, where i is the number of firms in the industry and market 
share is the proportion of firm’s sales in industry. ***, ** and * represents the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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R&D exp/Total asset
CFO inside debt 0.00
CEO inside debt -0.03 0.70 *
CFO relative incentive 0.05 0.44 * 0.49 *
CEO relative incentive 0.00 0.50 * 0.75 * 0.50 *
CFO current compensation -0.08 * -0.04 -0.09 * -0.12 * -0.09 *
CEO current  compensation -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.12 * -0.07 * 0.67 *
Cash 0.17 * 0.07 * 0.07 * 0.06 0.07 * -0.20 * -0.16 *
Leverage -0.02 -0.08 * -0.10 * -0.06 -0.09 * 0.05 0.08 * -0.29 *
Liquidity constratint 0.12 * -0.06 * -0.07 * -0.05 -0.06 0.13 * 0.16 * -0.44 * 0.23 *
Log(Total asset) -0.03 0.09 * 0.12 * 0.16 * 0.15 * -0.47 * -0.40 * 0.06 0.06 -0.14 *
Tax 0.08 * 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.14 * 0.04 0.05 -0.10 *
M2B 0.17 * 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.13 * -0.07 * 0.28 * -0.14 * -0.06 0.08 * -0.13 *
Stock return -0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.09 * -0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.10 *
ROA -0.14 * 0.12 * 0.15 * 0.12 * 0.13 * -0.19 * -0.22 * 0.30 * -0.29 * -0.35 * 0.21 * -0.16 * 0.14 * 0.09 *
HHI 0.00 -0.12 * -0.04 -0.14 * -0.04 0.13 * 0.13 * 0.04 0.04 0.08 * -0.14 * 0.12 * -0.01 0.02 -0.10 *
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5.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter gives an account of the sample selection criteria from the secondary data 
sources ExecuComp and Compustat. It outlines the functional form to test the hypothesis 
and describes how the variables are calibrated. The dependent variable i.e., the measure of 
innovation is proxied by R&D expenditure. The inside debt compensation variable has 
three distinct proxies: executive inside debt, a dummy variable equal to one if executive 
inside debt is greater than one (and zero otherwise), and executive relative incentive 
measure.  
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Chapter 6: Empirical Results 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical results. Section 6.2 reports the univariate test of 
differences in variables between high and low R&D firms. Section 6.3 shows the results of 
the multivariate analysis on the association between CFO inside debt and innovation. 
Section 6.4 shows the robustness tests where I distinguish between pensions and deferred 
compensation to investigate whether the basic multivariate model is robust to different 
specifications. This section also deals with the endogeneity issue. Finally, Section 6.5 
summarizes. 
 
6.2  Univariate analysis 
Table 4 shows the results of the univariate test of mean and median difference in variables 
of interest between high and low R&D firms, using the median R&D expenditure as the cut 
off value. The results show that high R&D firms have a higher average CFO relative 
incentive ratio of 5.92% compared to 3.64% for low R&D firms. CFO inside debt is also 
higher for high R&D firms, although the difference is not statistically significantly. These 
result are inconsistent with my hypothesis which predicts a lower CFO inside debt for firms 
with higher R&D expenditure.  
Similar results are found for CEO inside debt, being higher for high R&D firms. Cash 
surplus, liquidity constraint, and tax loss carry forward are also significantly higher for high 
R&D firms, consistent with the prevailing literature (Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), 
Bougheas et al. (2003), and Scholes and Wolfson, (1989)). High R&D firms are associated 
with significantly lower firm performance, measured by ROA and stock returns. 
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t-test Mann Whitney
Mean Median Mean Median  p-value  p-value
CFO inside debt 13.08 0.82 15.04 1.49 0.44 0.13
CFO inside debt>1 0.48 0.00 0.55 1.00 0.03 ** 0.03 **
CFO relative incentive 3.64 0.21 5.92 0.60 0.02 ** 0.00 ***
CFO current compensation 0.32 0.27 0.32 0.27 0.73 1.00
CEO inside debt 2.07 0.28 2.30 0.50 0.48 0.07 *
CEO relative incentive 4.01 0.37 5.23 0.81 0.15 0.09 *
CEO current compensation 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.30
Cash 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Leverage 0.40 0.21 0.35 0.21 0.21 0.15
Liquidity constraint 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.01 ** 0.01 **
Log(Total asset) 8773.44 2831.21 9251.79 1831.82 0.65 0.01 **
Tax 0.89 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.06 * 0.06 *
M2B 2.81 2.26 3.05 2.36 0.23 0.28
Stock Return 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.01 ** 0.00 ***
ROA 4.77 5.68 2.74 5.25 0.01 ** 0.50
HHI 0.57 0.50 0.60 0.54 0.18 0.18
Low R&D High R&D p-values of diffrence tests
Table 4. Univariate test of mean and median differences in variables between high and 
low R&D firms 
This table shows the differences in sample characteristics between firms with high R&D and low R&D 
expenditure for the sample period of 2006-2010. High R&D firms are identified by firm R&D exp/Total assett> 
industry median and Low R&D firms are identified by firm R&D exp/Total assett<= industry median. Executive 
inside debt is the ratio of executive debt equity ratio and firm debt equity ratio. Executive relative incentive is 
the marginal change in the executive’s debt and the marginal change in her equity holdings, divided by the 
marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal change in its equity, given a dollar change in the overall 
value of the firm.  Executive current compensation is scaled by executive total compensation. Cash is the 
cash flow from operations less depreciation plus R&D expenditure scaled by total assets. Leverage is the firm 
debt to equity ratio. Total asset is the total asset of firm in corresponding year. Tax is a dummy variable equal 
to one if a firm has a tax loss carry forward, and zero otherwise. M2B is the market value of equity divided by 
book value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current after-tax return on assets and stock return as change in stock 
price from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 − market sharei2, where i is the number of firms in the 
industry and market share is the proportion of firm’s sales in industry. P-values for t-test (mean) and Mann 
Whitney test (median) are reported in last two columns. 
 
  
 
 
48 
 
6.3  Multivariate analysis 
Table 5 and 6 report the results of fixed effect regressions on the association between CFO 
inside debt and innovation. Table 5 reports the results when the CFO is the only executive 
considered, while Table 6 extends the test to include CEO inside debt as a control variable. 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the industry-adjusted R&D expenditure. 
Table 5 shows that CFO’s relative incentive is significantly negatively associated with 
R&D expenditure in specifications (3) and (6). Hence, the higher the CFO relative incentive, 
the lower the firm’s relative R&D expenditure, consistent with my hypothesis. However, 
total CFO inside debt and CFO inside debt > 1 are insignificant in this regard. CFO relative 
incentive is the change in CFO inside debt ratio relative to the change in firm debt equity 
ratio. Therefore, these findings suggest that it is the CFO’s change in inside debt rather 
than the total level of inside debt of the CFO that affects R&D investment in the firm. With 
positive change in inside debt, CFOs consider their interests to be more aligned with that 
of debt holders. Debt holders expect firms to keep the risk level minimal to avoid 
bankruptcy. As R&D investment runs the risk of volatile outcome, CFOs with high inside 
debt reduce the firm’s investment in R&D.  
Looking at the control variables, there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
(p<0.10) between liquidity constraint and innovation only in specifications (1), (2), and (3),   
inconsistent with previous studies. Brown et al. (2012) find that firms most likely use cash 
holdings to smooth R&D spending. Therefore, liquidity constraint is argued to have a 
negative relation with R&D expenditure. There are two interpretations of this finding. 
Firstly, the firms in my sample (COMPUSTAT) are comparatively large firms which are less 
subject to liquidity constraint, either because of access to wider variety of financial 
instruments or because they can more easily shift the use of available funds between 
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physical and R&D investments. Secondly, large firms have more formal and established 
R&D program which is able to attract external financing.  
Firm size, measured by log of total assets, has a statistically significant negative 
relationship (p<0.01) with innovation, consistent with the small firm effect on R&D in 
Hansen (1992). Holmstorm (1989) explains this relationship in two ways. The first relates to 
the firm’s internal organization where large firms serve production and marketing goals in 
a way that compromises innovation incentives. The other relates to the firm’s relationship 
with the capital market, where concerns for reputation tempt large firms to act more 
cautiously to take risk. This incentivizes large firms to reduce investment in risky R&D 
projects.  
High investment in R&D increases the firm’s worth, which in turn increases stock 
return (Li, 2011). However, contrary to this idea, the regression results show a significantly 
negative relationship between stock returns and R&D expenditure. This result suggests 
that perhaps poorly performing firms see investment in innovation as a means of pulling 
them out of the current poor performance and so invest more in innovation. I find no 
statistically significant relationship between R&D expenditure and my accounting measure 
of performance (ROA). 
The firm’s tax status is mostly insignificantly related to innovation. This is inconsistent 
with Clinch (1991), who suggests that high R&D firms are more likely to carry forward their 
tax losses. R&D firms are mostly young with operating losses in the early years. Therefore, 
tax loss carry forward, which let the firm carry forward the tax expenses to a later profit 
year, encourages investment in R&D.  
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The coefficient on cash surplus is insignificant in all specifications which is contrary to 
the model and findings of Cincera et al. (2010). Leverage, market to book ratio, and market 
share (HHI) are also insignificant in the regressions. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFO inside debt -9.79E-05 -1.93E-04
(0.505) (0.259)
CFO inside debt>1 5.09E-03 4.74E-03
(0.856) (0.892)
CFO relative incentive -9.73E-04 ** -1.31E-03 **
(0.013) (0.011)
CFO current compensation -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.014 -0.016 -0.025
(0.956) (0.944) (0.905) (0.869) (0.853) (0.761)
Cash 0.377 0.372 0.373 0.439 0.434 0.428
(0.296) (0.3) (0.299) (0.196) (0.2) (0.205)
Leverage -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021
(0.715) (0.71) (0.741) (0.251) (0.253) (0.266)
Liquid constraint 0.144 * 0.144 * 0.144 * 0.075 0.074 0.073
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.435) (0.441) (0.442)
Log(TotalAsset) -0.579 *** -0.580 *** -0.580 *** -0.639 *** -0.642 *** -0.643 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tax 0.045 0.046 0.042 -0.105 * -0.099 -0.116 **
(0.685) (0.68) (0.707) (0.085) (0.116) (0.05)
M2B 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.573) (0.571) (0.571) (0.484) (0.465) (0.464)
Stock return -0.052 *** -0.052 *** -0.053 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
ROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.398) (0.397) (0.4)
HHI -0.001 0.003 -0.010
(0.996) (0.988) (0.956)
Intercept 5.456 *** 5.452 *** 5.466 *** 6.156 *** 6.161 *** 6.209 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.33
Table 5. Fixed effect panel regressions of association between CFO inside debt and 
corporate innovation 
The dependent variable is industry adjusted R&D/Total asset ratio. CFO inside debt is measured by three 
different variables. CFO inside debt is the ratio of CFO debt equity ratio and firm debt equity ratio. “CFO 
inside debt>1” is set equal to “1”if the CFO’s inside debt from equation (2) is greater than one and ‘0’ 
otherwise.  CFO relative incentive is the marginal change in the CFO’s debt and the marginal change in her 
equity holdings, divided by the marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal change in its equity, 
given a dollar change in the overall value of the firm. CFO current compensation is scaled by executive total 
compensation. Cash is the cash flow from operations less depreciation plus R&D expenditure scaled by total 
assets. Leverage is the firm debt to equity ratio. Total asset is the total asset of firm in corresponding year. 
Tax is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a tax loss carry forward, and zero otherwise. M2B is the 
market value of equity divided by book value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current after-tax return on assets and 
stock return as change in stock price from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 − market sharei2, 
where i is the number of firms in the industry and market share is the proportion of firm’s sales in industry. P-
Values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
firm. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 shows the regression results where CEO compensation has been included 
as an additional control variable on the association between R&D investment and inside 
debt. None of the executive’s (CFO and CEO) total inside debt measures are significant in 
any of the specifications examined. Interestingly, while CFO relative incentive remains 
significant in explaining firm innovation, CEO relative incentive is not. Therefore, when 
both CEO and CFO inside debt are put together in the same regression, CFO inside debt is 
found to be more important than CEO inside debt. While CFO current compensation is 
insignificant in terms of explaining R&D expenditure, CEO current compensation is marked 
as significant in specifications (1) and (2) only. The results for the other variables remain 
largely intact when I control for CEO inside debt. The 𝑅𝑅2 of each of the models ranges from 
27% to 33%, suggesting that the models have reasonable power in terms of explaining R&D 
expenditure.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFO inside debt -2.06E-05 -3.66E-05
(0.917) (0.862)
CEO inside debt -9.13E-04 -1.88E-03
(0.608) (0.374)
CFO inside debt>1 1.34E-02 2.45E-02
(0.683) (0.562)
CEO inside debt>1 -9.98E-03 -5.38E-02
(0.762) (0.285)
CFO relative incentive -1.02E-03 ** -1.45E-03 **
(0.012) (0.018)
CEO relative incentive 2.87E-04 4.67E-04
(0.67) (0.623)
CFO current compensation -0.057 -0.057 -0.058 0.025 0.026 0.022
(0.432) (0.423) (0.419) (0.777) (0.763) (0.801)
CEO current compensation 0.110 * 0.113 * 0.107 -0.097 -0.101 -0.108
(0.097) (0.093) (0.109) (0.373) (0.361) (0.326)
Cash 0.381 0.384 0.378 0.426 0.479 0.423
(0.293) (0.289) (0.294) (0.21) (0.162) (0.209)
Leverage -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.021 -0.023 -0.020
(0.68) (0.657) (0.714) (0.24) (0.211) (0.261)
Liquid constraint 0.139 * 0.140 * 0.139 * 0.076 0.089 0.077
(0.095) (0.093) (0.093) (0.427) (0.361) (0.422)
Log(TotalAsset) -0.576 *** -0.577 *** -0.577 *** -0.642 *** -0.644 *** -0.647 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tax 0.040 0.041 0.039 -0.110 * -0.101 * -0.112 *
(0.719) (0.711) (0.725) (0.069) (0.088) (0.069)
M2B 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.546) (0.54) (0.539) (0.497) (0.434) (0.467)
Stock return -0.054 *** -0.054 *** -0.056 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
ROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.395) (0.377) (0.389)
HHI -0.008 -0.002 -0.016
(0.963) (0.99) (0.927)
Intercept 5.425 *** 5.419 *** 5.434 *** 6.196 *** 6.202 *** 6.249 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.33
Table 6. Fixed effect panel regressions of association between CFO inside debt and 
corporate innovation – including CEO inside debt as controls 
The dependent variable is industry adjusted R&D/Total asset ratio and independent variable is CFO inside 
debt whereas CEO compensations have been used as control. Executive inside debt is the ratio of executive 
debt equity ratio and firm debt equity ratio. “Executive inside debt>1” is set equal to “1”if the executive’s 
inside debt from equation (2) is greater than one and ‘0’ otherwise.  Executive relative incentive is the 
marginal change in the executive’s debt and the marginal change in her equity holdings, divided by the 
marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal change in its equity, given a dollar change in the overall 
value of the firm. Executive current compensation is scaled by executive total compensation. Cash is the cash 
flow from operations less depreciation plus R&D expenditure scaled by total assets. Leverage is the firm debt 
to equity ratio. Total asset is the total asset of firm in corresponding year. Tax is a dummy variable equal to 
one if a firm has a tax loss carry forward (tlcf), and zero otherwise. M2B is the market value of equity divided 
by book value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current after-tax return on assets and stock return as change in stock 
price from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 − market sharei2, where i is the number of firms in the 
industry and market share is the proportion of firm’s sales in industry. P-Values (in parentheses) are based on 
robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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6.4  Robustness tests 
In practice, it is common to observe a significant difference between pension and deferred 
compensation. For example, the CEO of Lufkin Industries Inc. held USD3347.24 million of 
pensions but USD791.32 million of deferred compensation in 2008. On the other hand, the 
CEO of Fifth Third BankCorp held USD8479.5 million of pension but USD18,878.13 million of 
deferred compensation in 2006. In my study, pension comprises more than 80% of the total 
CEO and CFO compensation. This statistic calls into question the conclusion that deferred 
compensation has a role to play in inside debt.  To address this issue, I split the total inside 
debt into pension and deferred compensation to find out which better explains innovation. 
Table 7 reports the fixed effect estimates of the association between R&D 
investment and CFO pensions ratios. The basic regression reveals a positive and significant 
relation between CFO pension, CFO relative pensions and R&D investments. However, 
when stock return is entered as a control variable, the association between CFO pension 
ratios and R&D investment becomes negative. The relation is economically meaningful 
with a one standard deviation increase in CFO pensions and CFO relative pensions leading 
to a -1.22E-03 % and -4.59E-04 % drop in R&D expenditure respectively.   
Table 8 reports the fixed effect estimates of the association between R&D and CFO 
pensions, where CEO pensions are included as controls. Similar to results reported in Table 
7, CFO pensions and CFO relative pension incentive are positively related to R&D. Again, 
when stock returns ware included as a control, CFO pensions variables show a 
economically meaningful negative association with R&D. In contrast, CEO pensions show a 
significantly positive relationship with innovation. There is at best weak evidence 
(significant at 10%) that CEO current compensation is positively associated with innovation. 
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In both tables, liquidity constraint is significantly positively associated with R&D (in 
some specifications). Consistent with previous literature (Acs et al., 1988), firm size, 
measured by log of total asset, has a significantly negative impact on R&D investment. Tax 
loss carry forward leads to a significant reduction in R&D investment, consistent with my 
earlier results. However, this is inconsistent with Clinch (1991), who suggests that high R&D 
firms are more likely to carry forward their tax losses. R&D firms are mostly young with 
operating losses in the early years. Therefore, tax loss carry forward, which let the firm 
carry forward the tax expenses to a later profit year, should encourage investment in R&D. 
Similar to previous results; stock return is also negatively related to R&D investment. This 
is inconsistent with Li (2011) who finds a positive relation between R&D and stock return. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFO pensions 2.61E-05 *** -1.22E-03 ***
(0.00) (0.003)
CFO pensions>1 -9.62E-03 -2.61E-02
(0.69) (0.322)
CFO relative pensions incentive 1.90E-05 * -4.59E-04 ***
(0.075) (0.006)
CFO current compensation -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.019 -0.013 -0.024
(0.934) (0.953) (0.937) (0.819) (0.876) (0.777)
Cash 0.378 0.373 0.376 0.426 0.436 0.428
(0.294) (0.299) (0.296) (0.209) (0.197) (0.206)
Leverage -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.019 -0.021 -0.021
(0.717) (0.734) (0.718) (0.317) (0.278) (0.261)
Liquid constraint 0.144 * 0.143 * 0.144 * 0.072 0.075 0.072
(0.08) (0.081) (0.08) (0.454) (0.434) (0.448)
Log(TotalAsset) -0.580 *** -0.580 *** -0.580 *** -0.644 *** -0.644 *** -0.643 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tax 0.046 0.045 0.046 -0.122 ** -0.096 -0.112 *
(0.68) (0.683) (0.68) (0.047) (0.123) (0.06)
M2B 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.572) (0.569) (0.572) (0.48) (0.462) (0.47)
Stock return -0.052 *** -0.052 *** -0.053 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
ROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.404) (0.402) (0.395)
HHI 0.000 -0.003 -0.009
(0.998) (0.988) (0.959)
Intercept 5.454 *** 5.465 *** 5.455 *** 6.215 *** 6.191 *** 6.199 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.33
Table 7. Robustness fixed effects regressions of association between CFO pensions and 
corporate innovation 
The dependent variable is industry adjusted R&D/Total asset ratio. The independent variable is CFO only 
pensions, measured by three different variables. ‘CFO pensions’ is the ratio of executive pensions equity ratio 
and firm debt equity ratio. “CFO pensions >1” is set equal to “1”if the CFO’s pensions is greater than one and 
‘0’ otherwise.  CFO relative pensions incentive is the marginal change in the CFO’s pensions and the marginal 
change in her equity holdings, divided by the marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal change in 
its equity, given a dollar change in the overall value of the firm. CFO current compensation is scaled by 
executive total compensation. Cash is the cash flow from operations less depreciation plus R&D expenditure 
scaled by total assets. Leverage is the firm debt to equity ratio. Total asset is the total asset of firm in 
corresponding year. Tax is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a tax loss carry forward, and zero 
otherwise. M2B is the market value of equity divided by book value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current after-tax 
return on assets and stock return as change in stock price from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 −market sharei2, where i is the number of firms in the industry and market share is the proportion of firm’s sales 
in industry. P-Values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFO pensions 2.63E-05 *** -1.22E-03 ***
(0.00) (0.004)
CEO pensions 9.25E-06 *** 7.97E-06 **
(0.003) (0.026)
CFO pensions>1 -6.97E-03 -2.62E-02
(0.773) (0.317)
CEO pensions>1 -6.09E-03 -4.54E-02
(0.836) (0.316)
CFO relative pensions incentive 1.95E-05 * -4.53E-04 ***
(0.06) (0.006)
CEO relative pensions incentive 7.70E-06 *** 5.90E-06 *
(0.002) (0.051)
CFO current compensation -0.057 -0.055 -0.057 0.025 0.036 0.020
(0.425) (0.443) (0.427) (0.775) (0.683) (0.815)
CEO current compensation 0.110 * 0.109 0.110 * -0.101 -0.112 -0.101
(0.099) (0.103) (0.099) (0.356) (0.318) (0.357)
Cash 0.385 0.383 0.383 0.422 0.475 0.424
(0.287) (0.29) (0.288) (0.211) (0.164) (0.208)
Leverage -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.019 -0.020 -0.021
(0.683) (0.697) (0.684) (0.311) (0.266) (0.254)
Liquid constraint 0.140 * 0.140 * 0.139 * 0.075 0.089 0.076
(0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.435) (0.36) (0.429)
Log(TotalAsset) -0.578 *** -0.577 *** -0.578 *** -0.649 *** -0.647 *** -0.647 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tax 0.042 0.041 0.042 -0.122 ** -0.097 * -0.112 *
(0.702) (0.71) (0.701) (0.05) (0.096) (0.063)
M2B 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.536) (0.542) (0.536) (0.481) (0.452) (0.472)
Stock return -0.054 *** -0.055 *** -0.055 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.397) (0.392) (0.389)
HHI -0.006 -0.005 -0.015
(0.972) (0.978) (0.934)
Intercept 5.432 *** 5.435 *** 5.433 *** 6.263 *** 6.246 *** 6.246 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.33
Table 8.   Robustness fixed effects regressions of the association between CFO pensions 
and corporate innovation – including CEO pensions as control 
The dependent variable is industry adjusted R&D/Total asset ratio and independent variable is CFO pensions 
whereas CEO pensions have been used as control. ‘Executive pensions’ is the ratio of executive debt equity 
ratio and firm debt equity ratio. “Executive pensions >1” is set equal to ‘1’ if the executive’s pensions is 
greater than one and ‘0’ otherwise.  ‘Executive relative pensions incentive’ is the marginal change in the 
executive’s pensions and the marginal change in her equity holdings, divided by the marginal change in the 
firm’s debt over the marginal change in its equity, given a dollar change in the overall value of the firm. 
Executive current compensation is scaled by executive total compensation.  Cash is the cash flow from 
operations less depreciation plus R&D expenditure scaled by total assets. Leverage is the firm debt to equity 
ratio. Total asset is the total asset of firm in corresponding year. Tax is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
firm has a tax loss carry forward, and zero otherwise. M2B is the market value of equity divided by book 
value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current after-tax return on assets and stock return as change in stock price 
from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 − market sharei2, where i is the number of firms in the industry 
and market share is the proportion of firm’s sales in industry. P-Values (in parentheses) are based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * represent significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 reports the fixed effect estimates of the association between R&D 
investment and CFO deferred compensation. The association between CFO deferred 
compensation ratios and innovation is insignificant in all of the specifications. Deferred 
compensation accrues when executives make a discretionary investment decision to lend 
money back to the firm by foregoing cash compensation that they would otherwise be 
entitled to receive while they are in service. Findings suggest that this form of debt does 
not affect R&D investment.  
Table 10 reports the fixed effect estimations of the association between CFO 
deferred compensation and innovation, in which CEO deferred compensation enters as the 
control variable.  When stock returns enter as a control, I find significant association in only 
two specifications i.e., CFO deferred compensation and CFO relative deferred 
compensation. The association is negative in both cases. Consistent with my earlier 
findings, CEO current compensation (+), liquidity constraint (+), firm size (-) and stock 
return (-) are significantly associated with R&D investment.  
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Table 9. Robustness fixed effects regressions of the association between CFO deferred 
compensation and corporate innovation. 
The dependent variable is industry adjusted R&D/Total asset ratio. The independent variable is CFO only 
deferred compensation, measured by three different variables. CFO def. compensation is the ratio of 
executive deferred compensation equity ratio and firm debt equity ratio. “CFO def. compensation>1” is set 
equal to “1”if the CFO’s def. compensation is greater than one and ‘0’ otherwise.  CFO relative def. 
compensation incentive is the marginal change in the CFO’s deferred compensation and the marginal change 
in her equity holdings, divided by the marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal change in its 
equity, given a dollar change in the overall value of the firm. CFO current compensation is scaled by executive 
total compensation. Cash is the cash flow from operations less depreciation plus R&D expenditure scaled by 
total assets. Leverage is the firm debt to equity ratio. Total asset is the total asset of firm in corresponding 
year. Tax is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a tax loss carry forward, and zero otherwise. M2B is 
the market value of equity divided by book value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current after-tax return on assets 
and stock return as change in stock price from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 − market sharei2, 
where i is the number of firms in the industry and market share is the proportion of firm’s sales in industry. P-
Values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
firm. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFO def. compensation 3.88E-03 -1.53E-03
(0.172) (0.706)
CFO def. compensation>1 1.58E-02 3.73E-03
(0.779) (0.967)
CEO def. compensation>1 -2.57E-03 -3.69E-03
(0.368) (0.146)
CFO current compensation -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.017 -0.016 -0.024
(0.953) (0.949) (0.907) (0.837) (0.851) (0.775)
Cash 0.376 0.373 0.368 0.434 0.434 0.426
(0.296) (0.299) (0.306) (0.2) (0.2) (0.208)
Leverage -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
(0.719) (0.721) (0.719) (0.255) (0.255) (0.253)
Liquid constraint 0.144 * 0.144 * 0.142 * 0.074 0.074 0.073
(0.08) (0.081) (0.083) (0.441) (0.441) (0.444)
Log(TotalAsset) -0.579 *** -0.579 *** -0.580 *** -0.642 *** -0.642 *** -0.643 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tax 0.046 0.045 0.046 -0.099 -0.099 -0.099
(0.682) (0.685) (0.677) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114)
M2B 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.573) (0.572) (0.57) (0.464) (0.464) (0.461)
Stock return -0.052 *** -0.052 *** -0.053 ***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
ROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.397) (0.397) (0.398)
HHI 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.981) (0.982) (0.981)
Intercept 5.451 *** 5.454 *** 5.461 *** 6.167 *** 6.164 *** 6.174 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.32
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFO def. compensation 6.34E-03 *** -1.57E-03
(0.008) (0.754)
CEO def. compensation -5.13E-03 *** -3.82E-04
(0.002) (0.85)
CFO def. compensation>1 3.92E-02 7.32E-02
(0.461) (0.521)
CEO def. compensation>1 -6.88E-02 -1.44E-01 *
(0.179) (0.059)
CFO relative def. compensation -2.74E-03 -4.83E-03 *
(0.342) (0.066)
CEO relative def. compensation 1.39E-03 2.54E-03
(0.391) (0.186)
CFO current compensation -0.059 -0.058 -0.058 0.025 0.025 0.023
(0.412) (0.417) (0.417) (0.77) (0.774) (0.794)
CEO current compensation 0.116 * 0.110 * 0.108 -0.097 -0.095 -0.107
(0.082) (0.099) (0.105) (0.38) (0.384) (0.329)
Cash 0.385 0.379 0.374 0.429 0.438 0.420
(0.286) (0.292) (0.3) (0.203) (0.195) (0.213)
Leverage -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
(0.678) (0.688) (0.689) (0.247) (0.247) (0.245)
Liquid constraint 0.140 * 0.140 * 0.138 * 0.077 0.079 0.076
(0.093) (0.093) (0.096) (0.424) (0.414) (0.425)
Log(TotalAsset) -0.577 *** -0.577 *** -0.577 *** -0.645 *** -0.645 *** -0.644 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tax 0.042 0.040 0.043 -0.099 -0.099 -0.099
(0.708) (0.716) (0.701) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111)
M2B 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.539) (0.542) (0.541) -0.471 -0.474 -0.470
Stock return -0.054 *** -0.054 *** -0.055 ***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
ROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.39) (0.383) (0.387)
HHI -0.001 0.004 -0.002
(0.996) (0.984) (0.989)
Intercept 5.423 *** 5.426 *** 5.427 *** 6.201 *** 6.195 *** 6.201 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.33
Table 10. Robustness fixed effect regressions of association between CFO deferred 
compensation and corporate innovation – including CEO deferred compensation as 
control 
The dependent variable is industry adjusted R&D/Total asset ratio and independent variable is CFO deferred 
compensation whereas CEO deferred compensation has been used as control. Executive def. Compensation 
is the ratio of executive deferred compensation equity ratio and firm debt equity ratio. “Executive def. 
compensation>1” is set equal to ‘1’ if the executive’s deferred compensation is greater than one and ‘0’ 
otherwise.  Executive relative def. Compensation incentive is the marginal change in the executive’s deferred 
compensation and the marginal change in her equity holdings, divided by the marginal change in the firm’s 
debt over the marginal change in its equity, given a dollar change in the overall value of the firm. Executive 
current compensation is scaled by executive total compensation. Cash is the cash flow from operations less 
depreciation plus R&D expenditure scaled by total assets. Leverage is the firm debt to equity ratio. Total 
asset is the total asset of firm in corresponding year. Tax is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a tax 
loss carry forward, and zero otherwise. M2B is the market value of equity divided by book value of asset. 
ROA is a firm’s current after-tax return on assets and stock return as change in stock price from previous 
year. Herfindahl index is  HHI = 1 − market sharei2, where i is the number of firms in the industry and market 
share is the proportion of firm’s sales in industry. P-Values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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6.4.2  Endogeneity 
The basic analysis assumes CFO inside debt to be exogenous. But it is possible that 
inside debt is endogenously determined by innovation. To reduce this endogeneity 
problem, an instrumental variable estimation is adopted in this section. I estimate my 
model using a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) framework.  
Following Sundaram and Yermack (2007), I consider CFO age as my first 
instrumental variable for inside debt. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that CEO pension 
values are highly sensitive to age. In fact, pension values tend to rise more rapidly than the 
value of equity owned as CEOs grow older, giving managers increasing incentives to run 
the firm more in the interests of debt holders and less in the interest of equity holders. 
They find that the mean lifetime pension entitlement has a present value of just USD1.5 
million for 51-year-old CEOs, but this rises to USD8.6 million for 65-year-old CEOs. I 
therefore predict that the rate of pension growth accelerates with CFO  age.  
My second instrument is a dummy variable for CFOs who are new to the firm. 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) suggest that pension compensation can have the effect of 
bonding a worker to the firm, and companies may feel more of a need for a bonding 
mechanism when a new CFO is brought in. 
Following Anantharaman et al. (2010), I also use maximum state tax (State tax rate) 
on individual income as my final instrumental variable. Taxation plays a role in inside debt 
compensation. It provides opportunities for income deferral to future years, which could 
result in a net tax savings for the firm and executive depending on the marginal tax rates 
of each. Therefore, high individual tax rate motivates managers towards inside debt 
compensation.  
The specification of two-stage least-square model is as follows: 
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First-stage: 
Inside debt ratio𝑃𝑃 ,𝑆𝑆 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆 +   𝛽𝛽1Instrumental  variable𝑃𝑃 ,𝑆𝑆 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=2 +  𝜀𝜀𝑃𝑃 ,𝑆𝑆 .         (5)  
 
Second-stage: 
Innovation𝑃𝑃 ,𝑆𝑆 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆 +   𝛽𝛽1Fitted Inside debt ratio𝑃𝑃 ,𝑆𝑆 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=2 +  𝜀𝜀𝑃𝑃 ,𝑆𝑆 .                 (6)  
Table 11 presents the two-stage least-square estimation results on the association 
between CFO inside debt ratios and R&D investment. In the first stage regressions, the 
instruments New CFO, State tax rate and CFO age are statistically significant in most 
specifications. The Sargan-Hansen test statistics show the validity of these instruments. In 
the second-stage regressions, CFO inside debt is negatively associated with R&D in both 
specifications either with or without stock return included as a control variable. However, 
this association is statistically insignificant in both cases. CFO relative incentive has an 
insignificant and non-negative association with R&D investment which differs from the 
fixed effect results. cash surplus (+), liquidity constraint (+), firm size (-) and stock return (-) 
are statistically significantly associated with R&D investment. 
Table 12 includes CEO inside debt ratios as an additional control variable. In the first 
stage regressions, results show that all the instruments (new CFO, State tax rate and CFO 
age) are significant determinants of CFO inside debt ratios. However, in case of CFO 
relative inside debt, State tax rate is found to be the only significant determinant. The 
Sargan-Hansen test statistic proves the validity of the instruments used. In the second-
stage regressions, CFO inside debt ratios are replaced with the predicted value of CFO 
inside debt ratios obtained from the first-stage estimations. Consistent with previous 
 
 
63 
 
results, I find a negative association between CFO inside debt and innovation when I use 
the 2SLS estimation. However, in contrast to previous results, the relationship is 
statistically insignificant. Liquidity constraint (+), firm size (-) and stock return (-) are 
significantly related to R&D investment.  
Hence, in addressing the endogeneity issue, I find at best a weak association 
between CFO relative inside debt and innovation. 
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(1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (3.2) (4.1) (4.2)
First 
Stage
Second 
Stage
First 
Stage
Second 
Stage
First 
Stage
Second 
Stage
First 
Stage
Second 
Stage
CFO 
inside 
debt
R&D CFO 
inside 
debt
R&D CFO inside 
debt
R&D CFO 
inside 
debt
R&D
New CFO 13.473 ** 0.358 15.354 ** 1.638
(0.002) (0.932) (0.008) (0.781)
State Tax -0.624 -3.369 * -0.696 -5.270 **
(0.736) (0.065) (0.792) (0.049)
CFO age -86.665 *** 17.026 -110.171 *** 27.615
(0.000) (0.446) (0.000) (0.377)
CFO inside debt -1.31E-03 -1.33E-03
(0.239) (0.184)
CFO relative incentive 2.78E-03 7.41E-04
(0.430) (0.763)
CFO current compensation -5.327 0.083 -18.685 0.122 -4.578 0.020 -28.248 0.027
(0.665) (0.282) (0.123) (0.234) (0.792) (0.831) (0.110) (0.804)
Cash 53.348 1.005 *** 5.143 0.998 *** 57.428 0.899 ** 6.003 0.857 **
(0.180) (0.000) (0.896) (0.000) (0.305) (0.002) (0.916) (0.004)
Leverage -0.501 0.020 -0.229 0.022 0.038 -0.029 0.728 -0.027
(0.838) (0.205) (0.924) (0.204) (0.993) (0.201) (0.867) (0.231)
Liquid constraint 1.971 0.213 *** -0.813 0.223 *** 0.416 0.113 -2.041 0.119 *
(0.835) (0.000) (0.930) (0.001) (0.975) (0.111) (0.880) (0.097)
Log(TotalAsset) 11.629 -0.488 *** 1.254 -0.500 *** 10.077 -0.350 *** 0.148 -0.363 ***
(0.160) (0.000) (0.878) (0.000) (0.455) (0.000) (0.991) (0.000)
Tax -34.372 ** -0.106 -28.159 ** 0.013 -41.418 ** -0.143 -35.105 -0.067
(0.004) (0.21) (0.016) (0.919) (0.008) (0.119) (0.026) ** (0.574)
M2B -0.565 0.002 -0.077 0.003 -0.794 -0.002 0.003 -0.001
(0.374) (0.707) (0.902) (0.526) (0.343) (0.687) (0.997) (0.857)
Stock return 3.732 -0.058 *** 1.628 -0.062 ***
(0.240) (0.001) (0.601) (0.000)
ROA -0.127 -0.002 -0.085 -0.001
(0.689) (0.308) (0.791) (0.479)
HHI -49.993 0.105 -31.294 0.182
(0.207) (0.625) (0.436) (0.418)
Intercept 290.694 ** 4.731 *** -34.779 4.658 *** 433.951 ** 3.751 *** -37.067 3.709 ***
(0.008) (0.000) (0.746) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.816) (0.000)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.09 0.22 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.04 0.14
P-value of Sargan-Hansen statistic (0.124) (0.137) (0.308) (0.130)
P-value of wald test (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
Table 11. Two stage least square (2SLS) estimation of the association between CFO inside 
debt and innovation (industry adjusted R&D to total asset)  
The dependent variable is industry adjusted R&D/Total asset ratio. The independent variable is CFO inside 
debt in column (1.2) and (3.2) and CFO relative incentive in column (2.2) and (4.2). The instrumental variables 
are New CFO, State tax rate and CFO age. New CFO is a dummy variable equal to one if the CFO is new in the 
corresponding year and zero otherwise. State tax rate is the log of state income tax. CFO age is the log of 
CFO age. CFO inside debt is the ratio of CFO debt equity ratio and firm debt equity ratio. CFO relative 
incentive is the marginal change in the CFO’s debt and the marginal change in her equity holdings, divided by 
the marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal change in its equity, given a dollar change in the 
overall value of the firm. CFO current compensation is scaled by executive total compensation. Cash is the 
cash flow from operations less depreciation plus R&D expenditure scaled by total assets. Leverage is the firm 
debt to equity ratio. Total asset is the total asset of firm in corresponding year. Tax is a dummy variable equal 
to one if a firm has a tax loss carry forward, and zero otherwise. M2B is the market value of equity divided by 
book value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current after-tax return on assets and stock return as change in stock 
price from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 − market sharei2, where i is the number of firms in the 
industry and market share is the proportion of firm’s sales in industry. P-Values (in parentheses) are based on 
robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12: Two stage least square (2SLS) estimation of the association between CFO inside 
debt and innovation (industry adjusted R&D to total asset) – including CEO pensions as 
control 
The dependent variable is industry adjusted R&D/Total asset ratio. The independent variable is CFO inside 
debt in column (1.2) and (3.2) and CFO relative incentive in column (2.2) and (4.2). The instrumental variables 
are New CFO, State tax rate and CFO age. New CFO is a dummy variable equal to one if the CFO is new in the 
corresponding year and zero otherwise. State tax rate is the log of state income tax. CFO age is the log of 
CFO age. Executive inside debt is the ratio of executive debt equity ratio and firm debt equity ratio. Executive 
relative incentive is the marginal change in the executive’s debt and the marginal change in her equity 
holdings, divided by the marginal change in the firm’s debt over the marginal change in its equity, given a 
dollar change in the overall value of the firm. CFO current compensation is scaled by executive total 
compensation. Cash is the cash flow from operations less depreciation plus R&D expenditure scaled by total 
assets. Leverage is the firm debt to equity ratio. Total asset is the total asset of firm in corresponding year. 
Tax is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a tax loss carry forward, and zero otherwise. M2B is the 
market value of equity divided by book value of asset. ROA is a firm’s current after-tax return on assets and 
stock return as change in stock price from previous year. Herfindahl index is HHI = 1 − market sharei2, where i 
is the number of firms in the industry and market share is the proportion of firm’s sales in industry. P-Values 
(in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2)) (3.1) (3.2) (4.1) (4.2)
First   
Stage
Second 
Stage
First   
Stage
Second 
Stage
First    
Stage
Second 
Stage
First     
Stage
Second 
Stage
CFO inside 
debt
R&D CFO inside 
debt
R&D CFO  inside   
debt
R&D CFO   inside   
debt
R&D
New CFO 9.733 ** 0.747 10.219 ** 2.084
(0.002) (0.859) (0.017) (0.723)
State Tax -3.220 ** -3.184 * -4.133 ** -4.922 *
(0.019) (0.082) (0.034) (0.067)
CFO age -59.664 *** 12.790 -73.953 *** 19.964
(0.000) (0.571) (0.001) (0.529)
CFO inside debt -1.50E-03 -1.93E-03
(0.311) (0.169)
CFO relative incentive 2.95E-03 4.19E-04
(0.454) (0.878)
CEO inside debt 5.67E+00 *** 7.00E-03 5.71E+00 *** 1.00E-02
(0.000) (0.435) (0.000) (0.246)
CEO relative incentive -2.47E-03 1.58E-05 -3.20E-03 3.80E-06
(0.201) (0.375) (0.176) (0.812)
CFO current compensation 0.696 0.091 -18.865 0.124 6.056 0.042 -28.281 0.019
(0.938) (0.246) (0.119) (0.245) (0.635) (0.664) (0.109) (0.865)
Cash 79.323 ** 1.032 *** 4.377 1.003 *** 93.368 ** 0.973 ** 4.434 0.853 *
(0.007) (0.000) (0.911) (0.000) (0.024) (0.002) (0.938) (0.004)
Leverage 0.482 0.021 -0.263 0.022 0.378 -0.029 0.540 -0.027
(0.788) (0.179) (0.913) (0.203) (0.904) (0.209) (0.901) (0.232)
Liquid constraint 7.607 0.219 *** -0.896 0.224 *** 8.120 0.125 * -2.154 0.118
(0.272) (0.000) (0.923) (0.001) (0.406) (0.084) (0.873) (0.098)
Log(TotalAsset) 9.314 -0.490 *** 2.484 -0.507 *** 11.948 -0.342 *** 2.678 -0.366
(0.125) (0.000) (0.762) (0.000) (0.228) (0.000) (0.846) (0.000)
Tax -7.132 -0.078 -28.332 ** 0.019 -6.990 -0.106 -35.772 ** -0.077
(0.418) (0.312) (0.016) (0.892) (0.546) (0.216) (0.023) (0.541)
M2B -0.003 0.002 -0.106 0.003 -0.360 -0.002 -0.069 -0.001
(0.994) (0.612) (0.866) (0.504) (0.559) (0.708) (0.935) (0.861)
Stock return 1.722 -0.058 *** 1.680 -0.062 ***
(0.461) (0.001) (0.601) (0.001)
ROA -0.011 -0.002 -0.096 -0.001
(0.962) (0.308) (0.765) (0.466)
HHI -27.421 0.120 -32.109 0.173
(0.346) (0.579) (0.423) (0.444)
Intercept 161.652 ** 4.700 *** -27.526 4.711 *** 212.893 * 3.620 *** -25.687 3.754 ***
(0.044) (0.000) (0.797) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.872) (0.000)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.51 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.52 0.13 0.05 0.16
P-value of Sargan-Hansen statistic (0.111) (0.115) (0.360) (0.107)
P-value of wald test (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
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6.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I find statistical support for my hypothesis on the association 
between CFO inside debt and R&D investment. As hypothesized, CFO relative inside debt 
ratio, either alone or controlled for by CEO inside debt ratios, is inversely related with 
innovation. Large firms have lower R&D investment. R&D has a negative relation with tax 
loss carry forward and performance variables (stock return and ROA), while market to 
book ratio, cash surplus and firm leverage have no significant impact on innovation. When I 
address potential endogeneity between inside debt and firm innovation I find no evidence 
of a negative relation between relative inside debt and innovation. 
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings of the thesis, limitations and further scope of research. 
Section 7.2 summarizes the findings of the thesis. Section 7.3 explains the limitations of the 
study. Section 7.4 outlines the further scopes for research, while Section 7.5 provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
7.2 Summary of results 
This study investigates the relationship between CFO inside debt compensation and firm 
innovation using a sample of U.S. firms. While extant research (Wei and Yermack (2011), 
Wang et al. (2010) and Anantharaman et al. (2010)) focuses on the implication of CEO 
inside debt holding, this study is the first which focuses on CFO inside debt to proxy for 
executive compensation.  Based on a balanced sample of 1,025 firm-year observations 
representing 205 U.S. firms in the period 2006-2010, I find that both individually and after 
controlling for CEO inside debt, CFO relative inside debt has a significantly negative impact 
on firm innovation. Instead of encouraging innovation, relative inside debt appears to have 
a dampening effect on investment in innovation. This finding is inconsistent with the high 
degree of risk aversion of CFO. However, when CFO inside debt is separated into its 
individual parts, i.e. pensions and deferred compensation, the results are rather mixed. 
When I control for endogeneity in the relationship the results are at best weak. 
Although the findings of this study are inconclusive, the study is nevertheless 
important as it extends prior research by showing that CFO incentives may also impact a 
firm’s investment policy choices. I tentatively conclude that firms which want to invest in 
 
 
68 
 
R&D should keep CFO relative inside debt minimal. It opens further scope of investigation 
whether other types of compensation encourage R&D expenditure. The research is timely 
given the focus of Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 2006 proxy statement 
revisions which emphasize the importance of the disclosure policy of CFO compensation. 
The results are expected to be of interest to stakeholders who wish to assess the extent to 
which executive preferences are aligned to their own, to regulators who design executive 
compensation packages and to researchers who investigate the impact of executive 
incentives on financial decision making. 
 
7.3 Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations. One limitation is the non-inclusion of alternative 
measures of innovation such as patents and citations. Francis et al. (2011) use patents and 
citations as proxies for innovation while investigating the association between CEO non-
debt compensation and innovation. This study could not incorporate patent and citations 
as NBER patent and citation data are not available for the post 2006 period. Secondly, the 
sample used in this study may suffer from a potential survivorship bias. The empirical test 
uses compensation data from ExecuComp which consist mainly of large firms, , biasing the 
results in favor of the hypotheses. Thirdly, the inclusion of control variables, such as cash 
surplus and liquidity constraint in the regressions significantly decreases the sample size 
and reduces the power of the tests.  Again, the culprit is lack of financial data for all firms. 
Finally, because of the research design, the sample is limited to CFOs who occupy the CFO 
position for no less than five years. As a result, the findings may not be generalizable to the 
entire population of CFOs.  
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7.4 Suggestions for further research 
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis raises some interesting issues of further 
research on the relationship between CFO compensation and innovation. Firstly, further 
research can focus on other measures of innovation such as patent and citation when the 
data become available. Secondly, some psychological measures to motivate investment in 
innovation such as optimism measures and expectation measures of the CFOs could be 
used as independent variables.  Finally, delving further into the secured and unsecured 
portion of CFO pensions may also be a promising avenue of further research. 
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